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Article 1

ARTICLES

THE MYTH OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
Todd E. Pettys*
The government of the Union rests almost entirely on legal fictions.
-Alexis

de Tocqueville'

Many Americans have long subscribed to what this Article calls the myth
of the written constitution-the claim that the nation's Constitution consists
entirely of those texts that the sovereign American people have formally ratified,
and the claim that the will of the American people, as expressed in those ratified
texts, determines the way in which properly behaving judges resolve constitutional disputes. Drawing on two different meanings of the term myth, this
Article contends that neither of those claims is literally true, but that Americans' attachment to those claims serves at least three crucialfunctions. Subscribing to the myth helps to ease the tension created by the American people's
paradoxicalbeliefs that they are morally entitled to govern themselves and that
human beings often cannot be trusted to behave in morally praiseworthy ways;
it helps to ease the tension between Americans' commitment to self-rule and their
attraction to judicial supremacy; and it helps to secure the strong sense of
nationhood that so many Americans deeply desire. The Article suggests that
embracing the myth of the written constitutionfor its functional value need not
be seen as a shameful act of self-delusion, despite the fictive qualities of the
myth's claims. So long as courts and scholars maintain the necessary conditions, the American people can responsibly embrace the myth as an act of "poetic
faith."
© 2009 Todd E. Pettys. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Bouma Fellow in Trial Law, University of Iowa College of
Law. Many thanks to the participants in the Iowa Legal Studies Workshop and to
Lawrence Solum for their valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 164 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
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INTRODUCTION

Either explicitly or implicitly, two claims commonly appear in
American citizens' debates about the content of their nation's fundamental law: (1) the United States' Constitution consists solely of those
texts that the sovereign American people have formally ratified using
the procedures proposed by the Philadelphia Convention in 1787,2
and (2) when judges properly adjudicate constitutional disputes, their
rulings are determined by the collective will of the American people
as expressed in those ratified texts. Referring to those two claims
together as the myth of the written Constitution, I shall argue in this
Article that both of those claims play central roles in helping to legitimize and stabilize the political regime in which the American public
wishes to live, but that neither of those claims is literally true. Judges
and constitutional scholars thus face an extraordinary dilemma, one
that they have not yet fully appreciated: should they work to reinforce
the American people's attachment to the myth because of the benefits
that attachment yields, or should they take on the demythologist's
usual task of urging the rejection of fictitious claims no matter what
the costs?
The term myth carries two paradoxically different meanings, and I
intend to invoke both of them here. First, the term frequently is used
as a synonym for fiction.3 To say that a belief or story is a myth is to say
2 See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing alternative ways in which amendments to the
Constitution may be proposed and ratified); id. art. VII ("The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution
between the States so ratifying the Same.").
3 See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 501, 536
(2008) ("Is the [whole project] dependent on an epistemological fiction, a
myth .. . ?"); Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MicH. L.
REv. 1571, 1587 (2008) ("[Mlorality may be a 'myth' or 'fiction' . . . .").
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that it rests upon premises or makes claims that are-in some noteworthy sense-false. 4 In the realms of science and history, for example, where we place a post-Enlightenment premium on literal
accuracy, the term sometimes is used to describe those things that our
benighted forebears quaintly accepted as true, but that we find our5
selves no longer able to believe.
Second, the term often is used to describe a story or belief that,
although false in some respects, nevertheless reflects a community's
convictions about fundamental matters or helps the community
achieve important objectives. 6 From the vantage point of this latter
definition, the chief purpose of a mythological story or belief is not to
make claims that scientists, historians, and others would accept as literally true; indeed, in the eyes of a literalist, a myth's premises or
claims might be transparently false. 7 Rather, a myth's purpose is to
encapsulate a community's perceptions of its origins, its identity, or its
commitments, and thereby advance the lives of its members. 8 As
religious historian Karen Armstrong explains, a myth "is true because
it is effective, not because it gives us factual information. .

.

. If it

works, that is, if it forces us to change our minds and hearts, gives us
new hope, and compels us to live more fully, it is a valid myth."9
When a word carries different possible meanings-as is the case
with such words as trip (a journey or the act of stumbling) and class (a
4 See KAREN ARMSTRONG, A SHORT HISTORY OF MYtH 7 (2005) ("Today the word
'myth' is often used to describe something that is simply not true.").

5 See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 27 (1992) ("In modem times, from at least the eighteenth century, mythology has been relegated to the
fabulous and the false in contrast to reality and to its forms in science and history
which were launched on an unbounded quest for truth.").
6 See RicHARD T. HUGHES, MYTHS AMERICA LrVEs By 2 (2003) ("Contrary to colloquial usage, a myth is not a story that is patently untrue. Rather, a myth is a story that
speaks of meaning and purpose, and for that reason it speaks truth to those who take
it seriously.").
7 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 8 ("Mythology is not an early attempt at history, and does not claim that its tales are objective fact."); KEN DOWDEN, THE USES OF
GREEK MYrHOLOGY 3 (1992) ("[Myths] are not factually exact: they are false, not
wholly true, or not true in that form. But they have a power which transcends their

inaccuracy, even depends on it.").
8 See FITZPATRICK, supra note 5, at 15-16 (stating that myths often concern a
community's origins or identity); SHIRLEY PARK LOWRY, FAMILIAR MYSTERIES 3 (1982)
(stating that a myth is "a story whose vivid symbols render concrete a special perception about people and their world").
9 ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 10; accord LOWRY, supra note 8, at 4 ("What makes
a myth important is how it guides our personal lives, supports or challenges a specific
social order, makes our physical world a manageable place, or helps us accept life's

mysteries-including misfortune and death-with serenity.").
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group of students or a qualitative rank), for example-the usage's
context ordinarily focuses the listener on the specific definition the
speaker intends to employ, taking any competing definitions entirely
out of play. Matters can be far trickier with the term myth, because a
community's members might disagree sharply about the relationship
between a beliefs or story's capacity to serve useful functions and the
literal truth or falsity of all of its claims.' 0 Some might contend that a
particular beliefs or story's functional value is severable from its literal accuracy-and that the belief or story thus can accurately be
described as a myth in both senses of the term-while others might
see the same beliefs or story's value and literal accuracy as inextricably joined.
Christian theologians disagree, for example, about whether
Christianity's longstanding assertion of Jesus' divinity should be
accepted as literal fact. In 1977, a group of theologians published a
provocative collection of essays titled The Myth of God Incarnate,arguing that modern-day Christians should acknowledge that Jesus was not
actually divine, but that attributing divinity to Jesus is "a mythological
or poetic way of expressing his significance."" A second group of
theologians responded with a set of essays titled The Truth of God Incarnate, arguing that Jesus' literal divinity is essential to the Christian
faith.' 2 The first group was willing to draw a distinction between the
functional value of claims aboutJesus' divinity and those claims' literal
truth; for the second group, claims about Jesus' divinity were sapped
of any real worth if they were not rooted in historical fact. One
undoubtedly will find similar disagreements concerning the myth on
which this Article focuses.
The two propositions composing the myth of the written Constitution are familiar to anyone who has been exposed for long to Americans' constitutional debates. In arguments among laypeople about
fundamental legal issues, for example, the ratified texts routinely are
invoked as controlling.1 3 As Laurence Tribe recently observed, "[a]
10 Cf James A. Francis, Truthful Fiction:New Questions to Old Answers on Philostratus'
Life of Apollonius, 119 AM.J. PHILOLOGY 419, 421 (1998) (stating that "ancient readers . . .could, more readily than moderns, believe something to be truthful though
not factual").
11 John Hick, Preface to THE MYTH OF GOD INCARNATE, at ix, ix (John Hick ed.,
1977).
12 Michael Green, Preface to THE TRUTH OF GOD INCARNATE 9, 13-14 (Michael
Green ed., 1977) (rejecting the idea that Jesus was not actually divine).
13 See Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 375 (1982) ("Citizens of the United States, however, retain within their active political language the
purported commands of an allegedly comprehensible Constitution.").
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standard technique used by nearly everyone engaged in constitutional
debate is to denounce an opponent's constitutional claim as unsupported by the Constitution's explicit words." 14 The myth finds expression in legal scholarship, as well, such as when Keith Whittington
argues that "the people are taken to be sovereign.... the written text
of the Constitution is taken to be the durable expression of their will,"
and the nation's courts are "the designated enforcer of that embodied
popular will."' 15 One sees shades of the myth in Chief Justice John
Roberts' statement during his confirmation hearings that "[j]udges
are like umpires," in the sense that they "don't make the rules, they
apply them. ' 16 An early iteration of the myth appears in no less a
canonical source than Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion for the
Court in Marbury v. Madison1 7:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole
American fabric has been erected .... The principles... so established, are deemed fundamental ....[T] hat those [principles] may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.... Those
then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity
of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution,
would suband see only the [acts of elected officials]. This doctrine
8
constitutions.'
written
all
of
foundation
very
the
vert
Of course, Americans do not all hold precisely the same understanding of the myth's claims. As I shall discuss, for example, originalists and living constitutionalists have different understandings of the
14

LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION

39 (2008).

15 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 112 (1999); accord
CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS 290 (2008) ("A central teaching of American constitutionalism is that in America the people are the sovereign who rule
through the means of written constitutions."); cf.RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION 112 (2004) ("Though constitutional scholars and activists may be
more daring than judges, even they are generally reltctant to abandon the rhetoric of
adherence to the written Constitution. Even they want to argue that it is the Constitution, not them, that mandates a particular result.").

16 Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to Be ChiefJustice of
the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005)
(statement ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr., nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).

17
18

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 176-78 (1803); see also WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS

OFJUDICIAL STRAT-

16 (1964) (stating that, early in the nation's history, judges "appropriated to
themselves the myth that their function was solely expository" in the sense that they
decided constitutional issues "not by reference to any personal or partisan value system, but solely by reference to the terms of the Constitution itself').
EGY
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proposition that the constitutional rulings of properly behaving
judges are determined by the will of the American people as
expressed in the nation's formally ratified texts: originalists commonly
insist that the texts' demands are fixed and non-evolving, while living
constitutionalists are willing to read the texts differently at different
moments in time. 19 Regardless of their precise interpretive philosophies, however, laypeople and scholars alike frequently align themselves with the myth's claim that it is the will of the sovereign people,
as revealed at one level of abstraction or another in the formally ratified texts, that ought to determine the way in which constitutional
20
disputes are resolved.
Drawing from both senses of the term myth, this Article seeks to
establish and understand the mythological character of the two propositions that compose the myth of the written Constitution. I argue
in Part I that, in significant ways, both of the myth's propositions are
false. The United States' Constitution consists of far more than the
formally ratified texts; the great bulk of the nation's constitutional
work is performed by political forces, tradition, and judicial precedent. Moreover, laypeople and specialists alike frequently endorse
constitutional rulings that cannot credibly be said to have been determined by the textually expressed will of the American people.
While the fictive nature of the myth's claims is itself significant, it
is only part of the picture. For some, of course, it might be the entire
picture. Like those Christian theologians who insist that the value of
their faith critically turns on whetherJesus was, in fact, divine, 2 1 some
might insist that the propositions composing the myth of the written
Constitution are worthless if they do not accurately reflect literal
truth. I argue in Part II, however, that there are good reasons to resist
that conclusion. Hans Kelsen observed that fictions are a "cognitive
device used when one is unable to attain one's cognitive goal with the
material at hand."22 Just as fictions frequently are profitably formulated and used within the law, 23 I contend that the fictions composing
19 See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text (discussing originalism and living
constitutionalism).
20 See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (introducing this analogy).

22

HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF

NoRms 256 (1991).

23 See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 1 (1967) ("There is scarcely a field of the
law in which one does not encounter one after another of these conceits of the legal
imagination."); id. at 9 (defining a legal fiction as "either (1) a statement propounded
with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility"); see also PeterJ. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435,
1437-38 (2007) (giving several examples ofjudges' frequent reliance upon fictions).
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the myth of the written Constitution usefully help to legitimate and
stabilize the legal regime itself. I argue that the myth helps to ease the
tension between the American people's beliefs that they are morally
entitled to govern themselves and that human beings often cannot be
trusted to behave in morally praiseworthy ways; it helps to ease the
tension between their commitment to self-rule and their attraction to
judicial supremacy; and it helps to secure the strong sense of
nationhood that so many Americans deeply desire.
In Part III, I conclude by describing the delicate balance that the
myth of the written Constitution requires judges and scholars to
strike. Although the myth's claims need not literally be true in order
to serve the valuable functions I have identified in Part II, they must
remain within the realm of perceived plausibility. The fictitious
nature of the myth's claims provides the nation with the flexibility it
needs in order to construct a workable constitutional regime, but the
risks posed by abuses of that flexibility are grave. If judges and scholars push the nation's formally ratified texts too far to the periphery
and the myth's fictive qualities are repeatedly shoved to the forefront
of the nation's attention, the myth's claims may become too implausible for anyone to embrace even for those claims' functional value, and
the important objectives that those claims serve will be jeopardized.
Courts' and scholars' overarching challenge is to maintain the conditions under which they and the American people can intelligently
regard the myth of the written Constitution with what Samuel Taylor
Coleridge called "poetic faith," better known in our cultural vocabu24
lary today as the willing suspension of disbelief.
I.

THE MYTH AS FICTION

Again, the myth of the written Constitution consists of two claims:
that the United States' Constitution consists solely of those texts that
the American people have formally ratified using the procedures proposed by the 1787 Convention, and that when judges properly adjudicate constitutional disputes, their rulings are determined by the will of
the American people as expressed in those formally ratified texts. 25 In
significant ways, both of those claims are false.

24

2 S.T.

COLERIDGE,

BIOGRAPHIA

LTERARIA 6 (J. Shawcross ed., Oxford Univ.

Press, photo. reprint 1939) (1817).
25 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Our Unratified Constitution

At first blush, the claim that the ratified texts compose the
entirety of the United States' Constitution might seem patently obvious. After all, the delegates to the 1787 Convention identified specific
ratification procedures for elevating texts to constitutional status, and
it ordinarily2 6 is not difficult to discern whether a given text has met
those procedural requirements. Article VII of the Convention's proposal declared that "[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine
States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution
between the States so ratifying the Same." 27 That threshold was
reached on June 21, 1788, when New Hampshire became the ninth
state to give the document its formal approval. 28 Article V of the
newly ratified document described several ways in which amendments
could be proposed and ratified: amendments could be proposed
either by a supermajority of Congress or by a constitutional convention if two-thirds of the states called for such a convention to be
formed. 29 In either case, any proposed amendment would need to be
"ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress." 30 To date, the 1787
document has been formally amended twenty-seven times. 3 1 In light

of the fact that there is no ongoing dispute concerning which texts
have been properly ratified and which have not, 32 Stephen Calabresi

is surely correct when he writes:
I think the people in this country still believe largely what they
have been learning in their high school civics classes for the last 200
years. They think that we have a written constitution that has been
26 But cf. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (adjudicating the federal legality
of an amendment to the Ohio Constitution which provided for a popular referendum
on the Ohio General Assembly's decision to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution).
27 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
28 See Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuityfrom the Articles of
Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 464 (2003) (noting the
passing of this threshold when New Hampshire voted to ratify the Constitution).
29

U.S. CoNsT. art. V.

30 Id.
31 See generally Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1992) (discussing the history and
ratification of the Constitution's most recent amendment).
32 That is not to say, however, that all of the amendments that are widely deemed
to have been properly ratified were, in fact, ratified in accordance with Article V. See,
e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN,WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 110-13 (1998) (discussing
irregularities in the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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amended twenty-seven times, unlike the British who have an unwritten constitution that comprises important texts as part of their con33
stitutional tradition.
The written-unwritten distinction is indeed routinely invoked to
34
contrast the American and British systems of fundamental law.
While the British Constitution is unwritten and highly malleable, the
common wisdom in America often goes,3 5 the United States' Constitution consists entirely of the writings that are venerably housed in the
National Archives in Washington, D.C. 36 Although it has been more
than a century since he offered it, Christopher Tiedeman's assessment
of the American public's regard for the amended 1787 text remains
accurate today: it "has been placed upon a pedestal and worshipped as
37
a popular idol."
Just as it is inaccurate to say that the British Constitution is mostly
unwritten,3 8 however, it is wrong to say that the American Constitution consists solely of the 1787 document and its formally ratified

33 Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution:A Comment on Professor Lessig's Theory of Translation,65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1435, 1454 (1997).
34 See, e.g., ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 7-8 (2003) (stating that "[t]he first thing
anyone learns about English public law is that in England the constitution is unwritten," while the American Constitution is held up as the world's leading example of a
written constitution); Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 53 (2003) (noting that scholars frequently assert that "the
United States has a written constitution, while England's constitution remains in
unwritten form to this day"); Douglas G. Smith, Fundamental Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Nineteenth Century Understandingof "Higher"Law, 3 TEX. REv. L. & POL.
225, 241-42 (1999) ("If the people of the United States so desired they could have
emulated their English ancestors and established an 'unwritten' common-law constitution, but they did not do so.").
35 See ToMKINS, supra note 34, at 9 (stating that a "frequent mistake is to say that
the unwritten nature of the [British] constitution means that the constitution is flexible"); TRIBE, supra note 14, at 14 (stating that "plasticity may be said to be a defining
feature of the British 'constitution,' under which Parliament reigns supreme").
36 See Nat'l Archives, Rotunda for the Charters of Freedom, http://www.archives.
gov/nae/visit/rotunda.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
37 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 21 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Win. S. Hein & Co. 1975)
(1890); see also TRIBE, supranote 14, at 14 (observing that the ratified texts are "almost

instinctively treated with a devotion ordinarily accorded only to an object of national
veneration").
38 See ToMKINS, supranote 34, at 7 (pointing out that most of the British Constitution "is written, somewhere" and that what the British lack is a "codified" constitution-a document "in which all the principal constitutional rules are written down in
a single document named 'The Constitution'").
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amendments. 39 Nor is it the case that those ratified texts are incomplete in only minor respects. As Bruce Ackerman observes, the 1787
document and its enumerated amendments are "a radically incomplete statement of our higher law."' 40 Adam Tomkins makes the same
point, viewing the American Constitution from the British perspective: "[E]ven a cursory glance at the American constitutional text suffices to illustrate that notwithstanding its almost sacred status in the
USA it does not contain a complete code of all America's constitu'4 1
tional rules, nor even of all the important ones.
To see how that is the case, one must start by defining precisely
how the United States' Constitution may be identified. The American
Constitution may be recognized by the three chief functions that it
serves: (1) it creates the federal government's institutions, gives them
their powers, and defines their relationships with one another and
with their counterparts among the states; (2) it identifies basic rights
that individuals may invoke against governmental action; and (3) it
serves as the nation's fundamental law in the sense that, on matters of
governmental powers and individual rights, it supplies the rules and
principles that ultimately determine whether a given governmental
42
action is legally valid or void.
39

See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
29 (1969) ("The precision of textual explication is nothing but specious in the
areas that matter."); TIEDEMAN, supra note 37, at 45 (" [T]he great body of American
constitutional law cannot be found in the written instruments, which we call our constitutions; it is unwritten ....and is to be found in the decisions of the courts and the
acts of the National and State legislatures ....");TRIBE, supra note 14, at 155 ("That
there is more 'out there' than is encompassed in constitutional text, and that much of
what is out there nonetheless counts as part of our Constitution . . .seems plain
enough."); Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical
Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 928 (2007) (stating
that there are fewer differences than commonly supposed between British and American constitutionalism); David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 890 (1996) (stating that the distinction between written and
unwritten constitutions is less significant than commonly supposed).
40 Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution,120 HARv.L. REV. 1737, 1744 (2007).
41 TOMKINS, supra note 34, at 8.
42 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 113 (2001)
("First, a constitution establishes the supreme law that prevails in collision with all
other law. Second, a constitution literally constitutes the fundamental elements of
government and defines the powers of the most central institutions." (footnotes omitted)); TOMKINS, supra note 34, at 3 ("Constitutions perform three main tasks: they
provide for the creation of the institutions of the State; they regulate the relations
between those institutions and one another; and they regulate the relations between
those institutions and the people (citizens) they govern."); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 411-12 (2007) ("A constitution generally does three primary things: It constitutes the government, that is, it establishes
LAW
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The formally ratified texts certainly do important work on each of
those three fronts-they establish and allocate powers to the federal
government's three branches, they identify a variety of individual
rights, and they expressly claim the status of "the supreme Law of the
Land. ' 43 Yet those texts fall far short of doing all of the nation's constitutional work. If a newcomer to the United States wished to understand the structure of the federal government, the powers of its
institutions, the content of its citizens' rights, and the rules and principles from which Americans ultimately draw when determining
whether the government has behaved permissibly in a given instance,
he or she would need to do much more than merely study the texts
that the American people formally have assigned constitutional
status.

44

If one sets aside for a moment the critically important third function of the nation's Constitution (that of providing the nation's
supreme, fundamental law) and focuses on the Constitution's first two
functions (those of creating and empowering federal institutions and
of specifying individual rights), one finds that a great deal of the
nation's "constitutive" work is performed today by federal legislation. 45 As Ernest Young points out:
For virtually all practical purposes, the boundary between federal
and state power is set by the terms of federal statutes; likewise, statutes and regulations play a far more significant role in regulating
the separation of powers at the national level than do constitutional
rules. Many of our most important individual rights-rights against
discrimination based on age or disability, rights to welfare, medical
care, and social security-stem from statutes rather than the
46
Constitution.
Nearly all federal employees, for example, hold positions created
by statutes and administrative regulations, rather than by formally ratithe various institutions of the government and sets out their powers and obligations.
It identifies certain rights of individuals against that government. And (sometimes) it
entrenches these structures against change.
43 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
44 See WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO, THE MAKERS OF THE UNWRITT-EN CONSTITUTION 1

(1930) ("[N]o one can now obtain even a silhouette of the American political system,
if he confines his study to the nation's fundamental law as it left the hands of its
architects in 1787.").
45 Young, supra note 42, at 412; see also MUNRO, supra note 44, at 8 (stating that
there are numerous federal statutes that "are theoretically open to amendment or
repeal by exactly the same process as ordinary laws, but which supply certain important cogs in the mechanism of government and hence are virtually permanent and no
more likely to be changed than is the Constitution itself").
46 Young, supra note 42, at 412.
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fled constitutional texts. 47 Administrative agencies whose acronymic
names are familiar to lawyers and laypeople alike perform a significant
proportion of the federal government's labors, yet are created by statutes and are governed largely by another statute-the Administrative
Procedure Act 4 8-and its accompanying judicial interpretations. 49
The committee system and voting rules that dominate the way the
House and Senate do business owe their origins almost entirely to
House and Senate rules and conventions. 50 To many Americans
today, individual rights conferred by such statutes as the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,51 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,52 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 199053 are every bit as important as many of those
that are explicitly conferred by the formally ratified constitutional
texts. 54 In these respects, the 1787 document and its enumerated
amendments do comparatively little of the actual work of constituting
the nation's government and of protecting individual rights that the
citizenry deems important.
It is true, of course, that all of these statutory and regulatory
arrangements may themselves be altered by ordinary legislation, and
thus they do not provide the nation with the body of fundamental law
that ultimately determines whether particular governmental actions
are legally permissible. Even when one takes the Constitution's three
functions together, however-allocating governmental powers, identifying individual rights, and providing the nation with its supreme
law-one finds that the formally ratified texts embody only a small
portion of the nation's Constitution.
47

See id. at 417 ("Of the 2,677,999 civilian persons employed by the national gov-

ernment in 2006, only 546 were Presidents, Vice Presidents, Supreme Court Justices,

or members of Congress. The rest served in positions created ... by federal statutes
or regulations." (footnote omitted)).
48 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
49 SeeYoung, supra note 42, at 417-18 (emphasizing the importance of statutorily
created administrative agencies).
50 See id. at 419-20 ("Once Congress is elected, its operations are likewise framed
largely by extracanonical measures.").
51 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
52 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

53 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
54 See Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the "Statutory Constitution,"5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 243, 243-45 (emphasizing the role of the legislature
and courts in creating rules and shaping rights).
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Taking the Constitution's three functions as a group, the contours of American constitutional law are predominantly shaped today
by political forces, tradition, and judicial precedent. 55 As every law
student knows, courses in constitutional law do not devote most of
their time to examining the ratified texts. 5 6 To be sure, those texts
are not ignored. Yet if discerning the scope of governmental powers
and individual rights were as simple as reading the ratified texts, there
would be no need for judges and lawyers specially trained in constitutional doctrine and theory: the ratified texts are not particularly
lengthy, and lawyers, their clients, and the general public could easily

read them for themselves. When trying to discern the ultimate
answers to most constitutional questions, one quickly reaches the
point at which the ratified texts' explanatory usefulness has been
exhausted and, to really understand the government's powers and citizens' rights, one must turn to sustained political movements, longstanding historical practices, and the courts' evolving bodies of
doctrine.

57

Consider two brief examples. Article I of the 1789 document
makes the unelaborated declaration that Congress may "regulate
Commerce... among the several States. 5 8s That short statement does
not even purport to provide clear answers to the host of specific questions that courts have been asked to address concerning Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce. May Congress regulate intra55 See FALLON, supra note 42, at 113-16 (emphasizing the constitutional importance ofjudicial precedent and "[e] ntrenched historical practices"); cf SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 185 (1988) (arguing that the American Constitution
includes judicial and political precedent, as well as "fundamental documents such as
the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address and, beyond that,
aspects of the American experience that cannot be reduced to a text at all"); Michael
J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent,90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205-06 (2006) (stating that some
Supreme Court decisions are "super precedents," meaning that they are "constitutional decisions whose correctness is no longer a viable issue for courts to decide").
56 See, e.g.,
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed. 2007 &
Supp. 2007) (using court cases to explain the fundamentals of constitutional law).
57 See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 66-67 (2004) (emphasizing
the fact that many of the ratified texts' liberty-conferring provisions are framed in
abstract terms that do not purport to dictate how particular cases should be decided);
Daniel A. Farber, Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test?, 70 Mo. L.
REv. 1231, 1245 (2005) ("The special status of the constitutional text is unquestioned,
yet also puzzling. In a great many cases, the text plays no role-the terms 'equal
protection' and 'due process' simply do not tell us very much about how to decide
particular questions, nor does the phrase 'the freedom of speech."'); Levinson, supra
note 13, at 378 ("To view [the ratified texts] as a genuine source of guidance is naive,
however heartbreaking this realization might be.").
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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state economic activities that have interstate economic effects? 5 9 May
Congress regulate intrastate economic activities that influence interstate commerce only when taken in the aggregate? 60 May Congress
regulate activities that, although themselves noneconomic in nature,
have economic consequences? 61 May Congress compel the states to
enact economic regulations or to help administer federal regulatory
schemes?62 In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, may state
and local governments adopt protectionist measures aimed at shielding their citizens from economic competition? 63 Do state and local
governments have greater freedom to shield government-owned
enterprises from competition than they do privately owned enterprises?64 To what extent may state and local governments adopt nonprotectionist measures that burden interstate commerce? 65 Answers
to these and numerous other questions are derived almost entirely
from judicial precedent and longstanding historical practices, rather
59 See, e.g.,
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) ("The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among
the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end .... ).
60 See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) ("That appellee's own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove
him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.").
61 See, e.g.,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("While we need
not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature.").
62 See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.").
63 See, e.g.,
Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (" [W] here simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.").
64 See, e.g.,
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
127 S.Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007) ("Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with
the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.... Given
these differences, it does not make sense to regard laws favoring local government
and laws favoring private industry with equal skepticism.").
65 See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.").
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than from any text that the American people formally have assigned
66
constitutional status.

One finds a similar pattern in the law governing individuals' right
to speak freely. The First Amendment simply states that "Congress
shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech." 67 Does that
mean that all speech is equally protected, or are some forms of speech
more protected than others?66 Are there some kinds of speech that
receive no protection at all? 69 With respect to speech that is pro-

tected, are all government restrictions automatically invalid, or are
some kinds of restrictions permissible? 70 To what extent do people
have a right to engage in expressive activities in forms other than the
spoken and written word?7 ' Do government employees have the same
right to speak within their workplaces as they do in their lives as ordinary citizens? 72 May the government restrict a person's ability to pro73
The notion
vide financial support to candidates for public office?

that the First Amendment's text provides clear answers to such questions is utterly naive. Even Justice Hugo Black-who famously toyed
with the absolutist position that, when the First Amendment says Congress shall make "no law," it means it shall make "no law"-felt compelled to find nuances in the law of free speech that the First
See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980) ("The Constitution .. .accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.").
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (holding that child por69 See, e.g.,
nography is "a category of material the production and distribution of which is not
entitled to First Amendment protection").
70 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989) ("While
time, place, or manner regulations must also be 'narrowly tailored' in order to survive
First Amendment challenge, we have never applied strict scrutiny in this context.").
71 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) ("In deciding whether
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play, we have asked whether '[a] n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it."' (alterations in original) (quoting Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974))).
72 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (holding that, if an
employee is not speaking "as a citizen on a matter of public concern" when he or she
speaks in the workplace, then "the employee has no First Amendment cause of action
based on his or her employer's reaction to the speech").
73 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652,
2663-73 (2007) (providing an overview of one portion of the Court's doctrines relating to campaign finance).
66

67
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Amendment's text does not facially acknowledge. 7 4 For a useful
understanding of the law, one must look beyond the text, to the ways
in which the nation has done business over the past two centuries and
the ways in which courts have adjudicated particular claimants' free
speech claims.
The same point could be made, of course, about a host of other
ratified texts: although they certainly help to compose the content of
the nation's fundamental law, they do not even begin to contain that
fundamental law in its entirety. With that reality squarely in mind,
Barry Friedman and Scott Smith usefully propose the image of the
"sedimentary constitution":
Picture the Constitution scattered on a tabletop, the clauses strewn
all about ....
Now, lay atop each clause its history, its interpretive
development. Instantly the picture moves from two dimensions to
three; the tabletop becomes a topography. Some clauses of the
Constitution-like the Due Process Clause or the Fourth Amendment-are mountains of historical development . . . . Other
clauses-such as the Third Amendment or the requirement that the
President be thirty-five years old-are deep valleys, barely touched
in the intervening two hundred plus years since the founding....
Constitutional interpretation necessarily must take into
account the complete sedimentary development of each clause that
75
is our constitutional history.
As that image nicely illustrates, the first component of the myth of the
written Constitution-the claim that the formally ratified texts compose the entirety of the American Constitution, as defined by the
three signature functions noted above 76 -is false.
One might try to resist that conclusion by arguing that ascribing
constitutional status to tradition and precedent rests upon a failure to
make the appropriate ontological distinction between the formally
ratified texts and interpretations of those texts by courts and others.
74 See Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism:Intuition and Reason in
United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563, 576 (2001) ("Justice Black's
insistence on the sanctity of the text in the context of the First Amendment-no law
means no law-dissolved when he was confronted with intuitively uncomfortable
forms of communication."); Patricia R. Stembridge, Adjusting Absolutism: FirstAmendment Protectionfor the Ffinge, 80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 915 (2000) (observing that, despite
his purported absolutism, Justice Black "rejected free speech protection for picketing
by distinguishing pure speech, which deserved absolute protection, from speech
attached to conduct, which remained unprotected").
75 Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 36-37 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
76 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting the American Constitution's
three identifying functions).
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That is, one might insist on the primacy of the ratified texts, and
argue that tradition and precedent are permitted to wield the force of
fundamental law only to the extent they are properly derived from
those texts. The image of the sedimentary constitution begins, after
all, with the texts' various clauses being strewn across a tabletopthose clauses are the bedrock on which the mountains, hills, and valleys are subsequently established. One might insist that the term constitution be reserved for that foundational, textual layer, and that the
term interpretationbe applied to all that rests above it.
At first glance, the question might thus seem to be one merely of
semantics: within the realm of the supreme law of the land, are there
sources of law that are appropriately denoted by the term constitution
and others that are not? In Cooper v. Aaron,77 for example, the Court
carefully used that term-with a capital "C"-to refer only to the 1787
document and its formally ratified amendments. The Court declared
that, because those texts are the "'fundamental and paramount law of
the nation,"' 78 and because "the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution," it follows that the Court's
"interpretation [s]" of those ratified texts are themselves "the supreme
law of the land. ' 79 Yet if the Court's rulings on questions of govern-

mental power and individual rights do enjoy "supreme law" statusthat is, if those rulings ultimately determine whether particular governmental actions are legally permissible-then they are indeed functionally part of the nation's Constitution. Approaching the issue most
superficially, therefore, the issue might seem merely to be one of
determining when it is appropriate to capitalize the "c" and when it is
not.
If that were indeed all that was at stake, the issue could be placed
in the capable hands of the authors of style manuals. In the insistence
on the ratified texts' primacy, however, one finds far more than a dispute about proper terminology and capitalization-one also finds the
second component of the myth of the written Constitution. Joined
tightly to the claim that the American Constitution consists solely of
the formally ratified texts is the claim that, when judges properly adjudicate constitutional disputes, their rulings are determined by the will
of the American people as revealed-at one level of abstraction or
another-in those ratified texts. The myth of the written Constitution
thus suggests that we should regard the ratified texts as akin to
blueprints. Tradition and precedent properly exert the force of fun77
78
79

358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Id. at 18 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
Id.
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damental law, on this view, only to the extent that they have been
erected in accordance with the formally ratified directives provided by
the American people. If a particular tradition or line of precedent
does not trace its roots to the will of the American people as expressed
in the ratified texts, then it is illegitimate. It turns out, however, that
the second component of the myth of the written Constitution is just
as fictitious as the first.
B.

The Ratified Texts' Lack of Adjudicative Primacy

With respect to the myth's claim that the constitutional rulings of
properly behaving judges are determined by the formally ratified
texts, most Americans likely fall roughly into either of two familiar
camps: originalism or living constitutionalism. 80 There are, in turn,
two principal kinds of originalists. 81 Many laypeople endorse conservative politicians' call for judges who are "strict constructionists"judges who, as journalist George Will described them more than
thirty-five years ago, "base their decisions on the actual words and dis'82
cernible intentions of the [written Constitution's] framers.
Originalist judges and scholars, meanwhile, have increasingly distanced themselves from efforts to discern the Framers' intentions,
arguing instead that constitutional texts should be assigned the meanings that a reasonable interpreter would have assigned to them at the
time of their ratification. 83 Regardless of whether they emphasize
original intentions or original meanings, however, originalists are
80

See, e.g.,
Lisa Shaw Roy, History, Transparency, and the Establishment Clause:A Pro-

posal for Reform, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 683, 690-91 (2008) (describing the "great
divide" between originalism and living constitutionalism).
81 See Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak's
Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOzO L. REv. 1109, 1110-13 (2008) (identifying

and discussing these two species of originalism).
82

George Will, "StrictConstruction":An Interpretation,WASH.

POST, Mar.

2, 1973, at

A18, quoted in Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 411 n.193 (2007); accord Robin L. West,
Adjudication Is Not Interpretation:Some Reservations About the Law-as-LiteratureMovement,

54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 215 (1987) (defining "strict constructionists" as those who
"identify the [Constitution's] text narrowly with the intent of the framers").
83 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists, 45 Lov. L. REv. 611,
620-21 (1999) (stating that "[n]o longer do originalists claim to be seeking the subjective intentions of the framers" and that originalists today seek to discern "the objective original meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the
constitutional provision at the time of its enactment"); Farber, supra note 57, at
1246-47 (stating that the most common form of originalism among scholars today
"insists that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed by what a reasonable reader of
the text would have understood at the time of adoption").
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commonly joined by the conviction that constitutional texts' demands
are non-evolving. 8 4 When judges claim the power to deviate from the
texts' fixed meanings, originalists argue, they illegitimately give themselves a license to force those texts into whatever shape suits their per85
sonal preferences.
Living constitutionalists contend that, rather than try to limit constitutional texts to the subjectively intended or objectively perceived
meanings that they carried at the time they were written and ratified,
judges should ascribe to the texts those meanings that they most reasonably bear in light of the American people's beliefs and circumstances today.8 6 Advocates of this view charge originalists with
advancing an unfortunate brand of "legal fundamentalism"-the
belief "that fundamental law is timeless and unchanging, a view that
cannot be reconciled.. . with modern theories of law, language, and
consciousness. '8 7 Rather than seeing all constitutional texts as containing fixed instructions, living constitutionalists argue, judges
should flexibly interpret those texts' requirements, so that the meanings of those texts can keep pace with society's evolving conceptions
ofjustice and desirable government.8 8 So long as those evolving con84 See, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854
(1989) (" [T]he Constitution... has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual
devices familiar to those learned in the law.").
85 See Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed
Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV.
523, 526 (1988) (stating that conservative critics of the Court condemn those Justices
who appear "to view constitutional adjudication as a freewheeling activity that can
endow a text with any meaning whenever the (political) need arises").
86 See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, Mr.Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv.
L. REV. 673, 735-36 (1963) ("There is no such thing as a constitutional provision with
a static meaning. If it stays the same while other provisions of the Constitution
change and society itself changes, the provision will atrophy .... A constitutional
provision can maintain its integrity only by moving in the same direction and at the
same rate as the rest of society. In constitutions, constancy requires change."); cf
LEVINSON, supra note 55, at 193 (arguing that to be committed to the Constitution
does not mean that one is committed to a fixed set of propositions; rather, it means
that one is committed to working with others toward a political vision); Ackerman,
supra note 40, at 1743 ("Although Americans may worship the [Constitution's] text,
they have not allowed it to stand in the way of their rising national consciousness.").
87 Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism,107 HARv. L. REv. 30, 34 (1993).
88 See SAGER, supra note 57, at 5-6, 66-67 (criticizing instruction-giving theories
of constitutional texts and advancing a justice-seeking theory of living constitutionalism); Strauss, supra note 39, at 877 (stating that, when courts interpret the Constitution today, their focus often is on society's "evolving understandings of what the
Constitution requires"); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("[W]hen
we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the
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ceptions are rooted in concepts that are enshrined in the formally
ratified texts89 -even if perceiving the connection between the specific conceptions and the texts' concepts requires reading those texts
at a high level of abstraction 9 0-living constitutionalists insist that they
are remaining faithful to the textually expressed will of the sovereign
American people. 9 1
Although they disagree about the methods by which the texts
should be interpreted, originalists and living constitutionalists commonly agree that, when faced with a dispute concerning the Constitution's demands, a court's principal task is, at its core, one of textual
interpretation. 9 2 Citizens in both camps contend that the formally
ratified texts need to be the driving force behind constitutional adjudication because it is those texts that, at one level of abstraction or
another, embody the will of the sovereign American people. When
they purport to ascribe adjudicative primacy to the ratified texts, however, originalists and living constitutionalists alike rest their constitutional visions upon premises that are false. Members of both groups
endorse adjudicative outcomes that cannot reasonably be said to have
been determined by the textually expressed will of the American
people.
Before proceeding to discuss the fictive qualities of the two
camps' claims, I hasten to emphasize that I am focusing here on
originalism and living constitutionalism as they are commonly
embraced by the American citizenry at large, rather than as they are
embraced by all constitutional scholars who would call themselves
originalists or living constitutionalists. Many scholars today, while
placing themselves in one of those two camps, would readily concede
that judges' constitutional conclusions need not always be grounded
United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development
of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its

begetters.").
89 See generally RONALD

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

135-36 (1977) (pro-

viding a seminal discussion of the analytic distinction between "concepts" and
"conceptions").

90 Cf RONALD DWOMKN, FREEDOM'S LAW 10 (1996) (arguing that judges' constitutional adjudications should be rooted in the ratified texts, but need not track how the
Framers expected those texts to be applied).
91 See Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1755 ("[B]oth [originalists and living constitutionalists] focus on the same constitutional canon-the formal text running from
Article I ... through the latest twentieth century amendment.").
92 See, e.g., RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpretingthe Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (2003) (stating that Justice Brennan, a
living constitutionalist, claimed that the Constitution "must be interpreted by the
Court in each era according to evolving notions of justice").

2009]

THE MYTH

OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

1011

in the nation's ratified texts. Over the past ten years, for example, a
number of originalist scholars have emphasized that the ratified texts
frequently do not speak plainly to important constitutional questions,
and that courts and politicians alike on those occasions thus must shift
from constitutional interpretation to constitutional construction in
order to fill the ratified texts' gaps. 93 Although they insist upon the
ratified texts' adjudicative primacy when they believe those texts do
speak in a determinate fashion, these scholars acknowledge that there
are numerous occasions when political forces properly play a leading
role in shaping the constitutional conclusions that judges reach. The
fact that originalism has grown continually more sophisticated in
scholarly circles, however, certainly does not mean that popular conceptions have kept pace. Indeed, the very fact that distinguishing
between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction
is regarded as an important new development in originalist scholarship highlights the fact that even those in scholarly circles have often
failed to make that distinction, and thus have abetted an insistence
upon the ratified texts' invariable adjudicative primacy. My focus here
is on those many Americans (whether laypeople or scholars) who continue to insist that judges' constitutional rulings are legitimate only if
they are derived from the nation's ratified texts.
93 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 15, at 121 ("When interpretation has provided all
the guidance it can give but more guidance is needed, constitutional interpretation
must be supplemented by constitutional construction-within the bounds established
by original meaning. In this manner, construction fills the unavoidable gaps in constitutional meaning when interpretation has reached its limits."); Jack M. Balkin,
Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290869 ("Skyscraper
originalism views the Constitution as more or less a finished product ....Framework
originalism, by contrast, views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance
that sets politics in motion and must be filled out over time through constitutional
construction."); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEo.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
599, 611 (2004) ("Constitutional meaning must be 'constructed' in the absence of a
determinate meaning that we can reasonably discover."). Interestingly, even these
scholars sometimes blur the distinction between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional construction, claiming for the latter the same aura of authority that the
KEITH
former enjoys. See, e.g.,

E. WHrTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

5

(1999) ("Both interpretation and construction ... seek to elaborate a meaning somehow already present in the text, making constitutional meaning more explicit without
altering the terms of the text itself."); id. at 8 ("The political construction of constitutional meaning helps close the gap between legal requirements and constitutional
sensibilities, speaking with the authority of the Constitution even where the text does
not seem determinative."); id. at 14-15 (stating that it is often hard to distinguish
between interpretations and constructions, and that the distinction is often unimportant as a practical matter).
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1. The Fictive Quality of Originalism
Regardless of whether they emphasize the Framers' original
intentions or the ratified texts' original meanings, originalists generally share the conviction that the ratified texts' demands do not evolve
over time.9 4 Originalists insist that those texts' requirements remain
static until the sovereign American people alter the texts using the
procedures described in Article V of the 1787 document.9 5 In the
eyes of originalists who contend that courts' constitutional conclusions must always be derived from the ratified texts, therefore, there
are only two occasions when it is appropriate for the nation's courts to
alter their understanding of the Constitution's demands: (1) when,
after a regrettable period of misdirection, the courts conclude that
they have more accurately perceived the Framers' intentions or the
texts' original meanings, or (2) when the texts themselves have been
formally amended. Yet many of the most noteworthy changes in the
courts' constitutional understandings-changes that originalists and
others often readily embrace-have not followed either of those
scripts.9 6 Originalists are thus put to a choice: are they more firmly
attached to their theoretical insistence upon the ratified texts' adjudicative primacy, or to the benefits that flow from some of the Court's
non-text-driven shifts in direction?
No one would claim that all of the great shifts in the courts' constitutional bearings have been provoked by a rediscovery of the Framers' intentions or the ratified texts' original meanings. 9 7 Consider, for
example, the vast expansion of federal regulatory power that occurred
when the New Deal Court finally capitulated to the nationalistic ambitions of the federal government's elected officials. 98 The 1787 text
was intended and understood by the founding generation to be
remarkably antinationalistic-a fact we often conceal by glorifying a
few of the Marshall Court's rulings, ignoring much of the nineteenth
century, and pretending that the New Deal Court rediscovered the
founding generation's nationalistic vision and placed the country
94

See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (describing the views of the two

main camps of originalism).
95
96

See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing Article V's procedures).
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 39, at 884 ("The Constitution has changed a great
deal over time, but . . . the written amendments have been a sidelight.").
97 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 61-63 (1991) (arguing
that the notion of rediscovery is often a fiction).
98 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (declaring that "the
mechanical application of legal formulas [is] no longer feasible," and thereby
rejecting the Court's then-recent efforts to place sharp limits on Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce).
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back on the path from which the Court had briefly and regrettably
diverted it.09 Far from returning to the Founders' vision like a repentant prodigal child, the New Deal Court broke with the nation's original constitutional understandings by permitting the federal
government to assume regulatory powers that the founding generation scarcely could have fathomed.10 0
Nor can one reasonably argue that most of the nation's constitutional changes have been provoked by formally ratified amendments.
David Strauss points out that "[in] ost of the great revolutions in American constitutionalism have taken place without any authorizing or
triggering constitutional amendment." 10' Professor Strauss cites
numerous examples, the accumulated force of which is difficult to
resist:
[T] he Marshall Court's consolidation of the role of the federal government; the decline of property qualifications for voting and the
Jacksonian ascendance of popular democracy and political parties;
the Taney Court's partial restoration of state sovereignty; the unparalleled changes wrought by the Civil War (the war and its aftermath,
not the resulting constitutional amendments, were the most important agents of change); the rise and fall of a constitutional freedom
of contract; the great twentieth-century growth in the power of the
executive (especially in foreign affairs) and the federal government
generally; the civil rights era that began in the mid-twentieth century; the reformation of the criminal justice system during the same
decades; and the movement toward gender equality in the last few
10 2
decades.
99 See 1 AcKaERMAN, supra note 97, at 62-63.
100 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that the post-New Deal Court's "case law has drifted far from the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause"); id. at 596 ("I am aware of no cases prior to
the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from the Commerce Clause as
sweepingly as does our substantial effects test. My review of the case law indicates that
the substantial effects test is but an innovation of the 20th century."); BARNETT, supra
note 15, at 312 (concluding that "[t]he historical evidence overwhelmingly supports a
narrow original meaning of Congress's power 'to regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States'" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
101 Strauss, supranote 39, at 884; see also Ackerman, supranote 40, at 1750 (observing that "amendments tell a very, very small part of the big constitutional story of the

twentieth century"). Professor Strauss goes so far as to say that the amendments that
have been ratified have played only a small role in shifting the nation's constitutional
course. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARv. L.
REv. 1457, 1459 (2001) ("[With] only a few qualifications, our system would look the
same today if Article V of the Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution contained no provision for formal amendment.").
102 Strauss, supra note 39, at 884.
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These important constitutional developments were not prompted
by formal revisions to the ratified texts. Indeed, in the case of Professor Strauss' final example-the development of a body of law aimed at
achieving gender equality-the constitutional changes occurred at
the very same time that efforts to add a gender-equality provision to
03
the ratified texts were failing.'
Article V's lack of frequent use over the past two centuries is
hardly surprising. After all, complying with Article V was intended by
the document's authors to be extraordinarily difficult.' 0 4 When urging ratification of Article V and the rest of the 1787 document, James
Madison argued that, unlike the founding generation, Americans in
the future might try to amend the Constitution during periods when
the nation was not confronting the kinds of emergencies that prod
people to band together in a common endeavor, suppress their discordant passions, and find honorable ways to resolve their disagreements. 10 5 He also worried that if the amendment process could
readily be set in motion, efforts to amend the ratified texts would
become commonplace, an eventuality that would yield undesirable
consequences:
[A]s every appeal to the people [to amend the ratified texts] would
carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent
appeals would, in great measure, deprive the government of that
veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which
perhaps the wisest 6and freest governments would not possess the
10
requisite stability.

Madison claimed, moreover, that those at the 1787 Convention
had been aided by "a finger of th [e same] Almighty hand" that had
helped liberate the Americans from British tyranny' 0 7-hardly the
sort of document that mere mortals ought to tinker with lightly.
103 See Reva B. Siegel, ConstitutionalCulture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2006) (noting
that the Court adopted heightened review for gender classifications during the 1970s
and 1980s, the same period when efforts to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment were
failing).
104 See generallyJohn 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A PragmaticDefense of
Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383, 386 (2007) (stating that supermajority rules, such
as those required by Article V for constitutional amendments, usefully permit "only
norms with substantial consensus to be entrenched").
105 See THE FEDERAUST No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
106 Id. Madison also argued that frequent efforts to amend the Constitution
would "disturb[] the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions." Id. at 315.
107 THE FEDERALIsT No. 37 (James Madison), supra note 105, at 229-30.
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Although it was important that citizens retain the power to amend
10 8
their constitutional texts on "great and extraordinary occasions,"
therefore, it also was deemed crucial that the amendment process not
10 9
be made temptingly easy.
Over the past two centuries, the American people have embraced
Madison's argument that they owe the ratified texts great reverence.1 10 Those texts have come to be seen as sacred, with some modem-day Americans joining Madison in believing that "the Almighty"
played a role in their creation.1 1 ' Children's textbooks in the nineteenth century reflected the nation's enduring sentiments when they
urged their young readers to see the 1787 document as "'an old and
sacred bargain"'1 12 that was authored by "'the wisest men of the coun114
try,"' 1 1 3 that was one of the greatest written works ever produced,
and that ought to be defended "as it stands," without suffering the
dangerous indignity of frequent amendment. 1 5 David Hume's
description of many of his contemporaries in nineteenth-century Britain applies just as readily to many in the United States today: there is a
sense in which they see their government as "so sacred and inviolate,
that it must be little less than sacrilege ...
smallest article."' 16

to touch or invade it, in the

108 THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison), supra note 105, at 314.
109 See id. (claiming that although having the power to amend the Constitution is
crucial, there are "insuperable objections against [its] proposed recurrence to the
people").
110 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting the 1787 text's status as "a
popular idol").
111 See Michael Sink, Note, Restoring OurAncient ConstitutionalFaith, 75 U. COLO. L.
REv. 921, 929 (2004) ("Some Americans still believe that the Constitution is a divinely
inspired document.").
112 RUTH MILLER ELSON, GUARDIANS OF TRADITION 293 (1964) (quotingJOHN BENSON LOSSING, PRIMARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 170 (New York, Mason Bros.
1857)).
113 Id. at 292 (quoting G.P. QUACKENBOS, A PRIMARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 141 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1869)).
114 Id. (citing HENRY E. CHAMBERS, A HIGHER HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 271
(New Orleans, F.F. Hansell & Bro. 1889)).
115 Id. at 293.
116 DAVID HUME, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT (1752), reprinted in 1 ESSAYS MORAL,
POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 443 (photo. reprint 1964) (Thomas Hill Green & Thomas
Hodge Grose eds., 1882). The Eighteenth Amendment, for example, is regarded as a
national embarrassment, not only because it adopted prohibitionist policies deemed
unacceptable only a few years later, but because it used the nation's sacred texts as a
vehicle for trying to achieve narrow policy objectives. SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 99 (1980) (citing the Eighteenth Amendment and its quick repeal as an
example of what can happen when the nation foolishly attempts to "freeze" shifting
values in a constitutional text); Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution With-
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While sharing Madison's profound reverence for the ratified
texts, the American people over the past two centuries have paradoxically identified numerous ways in which the nation's constitutional
bearings have needed to be changed. 117 To put those changes into
effect, the American people have opted to make formally amending
their sacred texts the exception, rather than the rule. Americans in
the modern era instead have relied primarily upon judicial review and
upon the transformative power of social movements, 118 reserving Article V for making several structural changes in the federal government 19° and for addressing a handful of issues concerning the right to
vote. 120 As Paul Brest observed more than a quarter of a century ago,
"the practice of [informally] supplementing and derogating from the
[ratified] text and original understanding is itself part of our constitu1 21
tional tradition."
out Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment,
12 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 217 (1995) ("The Eighteenth Amendment ... is nearly
everybody's prime example of a constitutionally dumb idea."). See generally U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 ("After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States ...for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."); id. amend. XXI, § I ("The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.").
117 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
118 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043, 1044 (1988) ("[Tlhe first, most undeniable,
inalienable and important, if unenumerated, right of the People is the right of a
majority of voters to amend the Constitution-even in ways not expressly provided for
by Article V.").
119 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the popular election of Senators);
id. amend. XX (establishing calendars for presidential terms and congressional
assemblies, and providing for the filling of presidential vacancies arising between the
time of the election and the time of the newly elected president's installation); id.
amend. XXII (limiting presidents to two terms in office); id. amend. XXIII (allowing
the District of Columbia to participate in the Electoral College); id. amend. XXV
(addressing issues of presidential succession in cases of death, resignation, and incapacity); id. amend. XXVII (preventing changes in senators' and representatives' salaries from taking effect "until an election of Representatives shall have intervened").
120 See id. amend. XIX (granting women the right to vote); id. amend. XXIV
(abolishing poll taxes in federal elections); id. amend. XXVI (guaranteeing the right
to vote to persons who are at least eighteen years old). The one exception is found in
the nation's brief experiment with establishing Prohibition as a matter of federal constitutional law. See id. amend. XVIII (establishing Prohibition); id. amend. XXI
(repealing the Eighteenth Amendment).
121 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 225 (1980); see also Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's
We the People, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 324 (1992) (book review) ("Nothing in our
history... supports the view that the decisions [made at one moment in time] serve
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Consider, once again, Professor Strauss' recitation of some of the
many areas in which the nation's constitutional precepts have
shifted-areas ranging from the dramatic increase in the scope of the
federal government's regulatory power, to the increased power of the
President in matters involving foreign affairs, to the recognition of a
right to privacy and other civil rights, to dramatic reforms of the criminal justice system. 122 As several scholars have pointed out in recent
years, these and other constitutional changes have been produced by
complex interactions between the citizenry, its social and political
leaders, and the courts. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson contend,
for example, that "[p1 artisan entrenchment through presidential
appointments to the judiciary is the best account of how the meaning
of the Constitution changes over time through Article III interpretation rather than through Article V amendment."1 23 Professor Balkin
and Reva Siegel argue that social movements are central tools of constitutional change. 124 William Eskridge and John Ferejohn point out
that judicial resolution of constitutional disputes "has proven easier
for our system than the bulky process of formal constitutional amendment entailed by Article V.' 125 To find the impetus for many of the
nation's most important constitutional changes, one would indeed
search in vain for corresponding changes to the formally ratified texts.
One must look instead to the norm-shaping activities of the American
126
people, their leaders, and the courts.
as a blueprint, a set of instructions by which one generation binds its successors until
such time as one of the latter deliberately alters the blueprint.").
122 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
123 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understandingthe ConstitutionalRevolution,
87 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1068 (2001).
124 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REv. 927, 947 (2006) ("Courts arrive in medias res, absorbing the shocks
caused by social movements and assisting in the reconstitution of social understandings in the wake of movement struggle .... Litigation before courts is only one of
many possible fora in which movements fight these battles.").
125 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuK L.J. 1215,
1267-68 (2001); see alsoJames E. Fleming, We the UnconventionalAmerican People, 65 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1513, 1537-39 (1998) (arguing that many of the nation's constitutional
changes in the twentieth century occurred through creative acts of judicial review,
rather than through ratified amendments).
126 See Siegel, supra note 103, at 1324 (citing the rejection of the Equal Rights
Amendment as an example of a nontextual event that shaped constitutional law);
Strauss, supra note 39, at 934 ("Today it is those principles [developed by judges and
the American people] that make up our Constitution."); Strauss, supra note 101, at
1459 ("[O]ur [constitutional] system has other ways of changing besides formal
amendments: court decisions, important legislation, [and] gradual accretion of
power .. ").
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An originalist might respond by contending that, if changes in
the nation's constitutional bearings have indeed been provoked by
forces other than changes in the ratified texts or discoveries regarding
the Framers' original intentions or the ratified texts' original meanings, then all of those changes are illegitimate. It is virtually impossible, however, to commit oneself seriously to that argument. Even
originalists ignore the constitutional directions toward which original
intentions or meanings seem to point when those intentions or meanings are judged to be sufficiently undesirable. 27 As Morton Horwitz
has argued, "[t] o the extent proponents of originalism insist that their
constitutional vision reflects timeless textual truths, the exceptions
they make-either for practical or political purposes-strip the theory
of much of its legitimating power.' 28 One familiar example, already
noted, is the vast expansion of power that Congress is permitted to
wield in the name of the Commerce Clause-an expansion that some
originalists might protest in select respects, but that few would
denounce in its entirety. 129 Another familiar example, also already
noted, is the increased protection that the courts provide today

against acts of gender discrimination. 130

Briefly consider two addi-

tional examples that are somewhat less well known.
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the
127 See Horwitz, supra note 87, at 66 (noting that modern originalists would not
accept the "original" assumption that the President's primary role was to merely execute the laws, or debate whether the President had the power to effectuate the Louisiana Purchase).
128 Id. at 65-66; see also FALLON, supra note 42, at 14 (stating that one of originalism's great weaknesses is "its incompatibility with enormous bodies of nonoriginalist
precedent," much of which "is now so rooted in our system, and so surrounded by
institutions and expectations that depend on it, that even originalists commonly
acknowledge that their theory could not sensibly be put into practice without a good
deal of trimming").
129 See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Commerce
Clause). Justice Thomas is one of the few prominent advocates of dramatically cutting the powers Congress is permitted to wield under the Commerce Clause. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In a
future case, we ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner
that both makes sense of our more recent case law and is more faithful to the original
understanding of that Clause.").
130 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a PoliticalPractice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FoRDHAn L. REV. 545, 559-60 (2006) (arguing that few originalists
today would argue against applying heightened scrutiny for gender classifications,
notwithstanding the lack of originalism-based justifications for reading the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in that way); see also supra note 103 and
accompanying text (noting the increased protection against gender discrimination).
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Government for a redress of grievances."' 31 Today, the Petitions
Clause has largely been collapsed into the First Amendment's guarantee of the freedom of speech.' 3 2 Viewed superficially, that seems
appropriate-if one has a right to speak, then surely one has a right to
speak in the form of sending oral or written petitions to one's governing officials. At the time of the First Amendment's ratification,
however, the Petitions Clause was not nearly so redundant1 33 Building on practices developed in Britain and in the American colonies,
and remembering the colonists' outrage when King George III
refused to respond to the colonists' grievances, the nation's Founders
and their immediate successors regarded the right to petition as an
important means by which citizens could force items onto the nation's
legislative agenda.' 3 When citizens presented their elected legislative
leaders with a request that they address a given matter, it was understood by all concerned that those legislative officials were obliged to
consider the matter and respond.1 3 5 That practice endured for nearly
half a century, 3 6 until Congress found itself deluged by abolitionists'
antislavery petitions.' 3 7 In 1844, Congress finally disclaimed any obligation to respond, adopting a rule under which petitions were
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L.
Rv. 739, 751 (1999) ("In this century, the Supreme Court has tended to collapse the
right to petition into the rights of free speech and expression.").
133 See id. at 741, 750-51.
134 SeeTHE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776) ("In every stage of
these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our
repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury."); K.K. DuVivier, The
131

United States as a Democratic Ideal? International Lessons in Referendum Democracy, 79

L. REV. 821, 827-30 (2006) (reviewing the Petitions Clause's history); Lawson &
Seidman, supra note 132, at 739 ("The near-unanimous conclusion of the modern
commentators, drawing on the rich and important history of the Anglo-American
right to petition, is that there is more to the Petitions Clause than is generally recognized by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence or by contemporary understandings and
practice.").
TEMP.

135 See Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government
for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142-43 (1986) ("The original design of

the First Amendment petition clause-stemming from the right to petition local
assemblies in colonial America, and forgotten today-included a governmental duty
to consider petitioners' grievances." (footnotes omitted)).
136 See id. at 155-57 (describing the manner in which petitions were customarily
handled).
137 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 132, at 751 (stating that "an onslaught of
antislavery petitioning [beginning in the 1830s] sparked heated debate about Congress' duties to receive and respond to petitions"); Higginson, supra note 135, at
158-65 (describing the battle in Congress about how antislavery petitions should be
handled).

1020

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84:3

referred to committees where, if the committee members were so
inclined, the petitions could "sleep the sleep of death."'138 Restoring
the original meaning of the Petitions Clause in modern America is
inconceivable-Congress simply could not genuinely consider and
respond to each and every petition that its millions of citizens decided
to present. Like their nonoriginalist counterparts, originalists have
been happy to allow the Petitions Clause's original significance to fade
13 9
quietly into the nation's premodern past.
The Suspension Clause provides a second example. Article I of
the 1787 Convention's text states, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it."140 Today, it is almost universally believed that the Suspension Clause's central purpose is to
place limits on Congress's ability to strip the federal courts of their
power to award habeas relief to persons illegally held by state or federal officials.14 1 When the 1787 text was ratified, however, the Suspension Clause was understood to be aimed at ensuring that state courts
would retain the power to order the release of persons wrongly imprisoned by the federal government. 142 After all, the' early Americans had
great trepidations about the ways in which persons holding the newly
138 DuVivier, supra note 134, at 829-30 (quoting 11 REG. DEB. 1137 (1835)
(speech of Rep. John Dickson of New York)).
139 One commentator thus writes:
The historian may chide legal scholars and judges alike who, while protesting fidelity to the Framers' intent, have in fact acquiesced in the evisceration of the original meaning of the right to petition, a right which had
compelled legislatures to accord citizens' petitions fair hearing and
consideration.
Higginson, supra note 135, at 166.
140 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
141 See Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relieffor FederalExtrajudicialDetainees, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 265, 311 (2007) ("(C]ourts and scholars.., have almost invariably assumed
that the Suspension Clause's chief function is to place limits on Congress's ability to
suspend the federal writ.").
142 William Duker convincingly argues:
[T]he debates in the federal and state conventions, the location of the
habeas clause [in Section 9 of Article I, which in several instances imposes
limits on Congress' power with respect to the states], and the contemporary
commentary support the thesis that the habeas clause was designed to
restrict Congressional power to suspend state habeas [relief] for federal
prisoners.
WILIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 135 (1980); see also
Pettys, supra note 141, at 309-10 (identifying several scholars who, like the author,
believe that "the framers' primary objective was to protect state courts' ability to come
to the aid of federal prisoners").
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created federal offices might violate citizens' liberties, and they
regarded the state governments as their liberties' primary guardians. 143 For more than three-quarters of a century, it remained widely
understood that the state courts were assured of the power to provide
relief to persons unlawfully detained by federal officials; in hundreds
of cases, state courts successfully granted habeas relief to persons
deemed unlawfully held in federal custody. 144 That practice abruptly
came to an end in 1872, however, when the Supreme Court-with no
discussion of the Suspension Clause's history, original purpose, or
original understanding-summarily declared that, if a person alleges
that he or she is being held illegally by federal officials, "it is for the
courts or the judicial officers of the United States, and those courts or
officers alone, to grant him [or her] release." 145 Finding themselves
unable to imagine a nation in which the federal government is not
predominant in such matters, many modern-day Americans might
agree with William Duker that reviving the Suspension Clause's original meaning is a cause best "reserved for the antiquarian." 14 6 One will

search in vain today for originalist scholars and judges who are willing
to call that cause their own.
Such examples reveal that the force ultimately driving the push to
adopt originalism's methods is not always an unyielding commitment
to the Framers' intentions or the ratified texts' original meanings.
Rather, originalism often is fueled by its proponents' belief that an
emphasis on original intentions or original meanings ordinarily will
produce outcomes that are compatible with the values that originalism's proponents hold as their own. 14 7 Because modern-day political
143 See Pettys, supra note 141, at 309 (arguing that the Framers believed the Suspension Clause ensured that state courts could order the release of persons unlawfully
held by the federal government).
144 See id. at 270-88 (describing numerous such cases).
145 Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411 (1872); see also Pettys, supra note
141, at 288-307 (critiquing Tarb/e's Case).
146 DUtER, supra note 142, at 155. But see Pettys, supra note 141, at 322 ("Neither
the Court nor scholars have identified any persuasive rationale for concluding that
the (Suspension Clause's] promise is one we may ignore. It is time to allow state
courts to leave their seats on the sidelines and get back into the game.").
147 See Post & Siegel, supra note 130, at 560 ("As a political practice .... originalism aspires to 'return to Constitutional authenticity' only insofar as it perceives
authenticity to make sense in the present." (quoting Edwin Meese III, A Return to
ConstitutionalInterpretationfrom JudicialLaw-Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925, 931
(1996))); see also Michael S. Moore, The DeadHand of ConstitutionalTradition, 19 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 263, 272-73 (1996) (suggesting that we purport to "defer" to tradi-

tions only when they coincide with our own preferences, and that a "past that has
authority only insofar as it agrees with present judgment has no authority at all").
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conservatives assume that many of the values they hold dear were held
by many Americans at the time that the constitutional texts were written and ratified, it thus is not surprising to find that originalism is
especially popular in conservative circles. 48 Morton Horwitz contends, for example, that originalists' willingness to abandon their
methods when they produce undesirable outcomes reveals "the extent
to which originalism is a rather thin disguise for political conservativism.'

49

Robert Post and Reva Siegel similarly argue that originalism's

popularity "does not reflect the analytic force of its jurisprudence, but
instead depends upon its capacity to fuse aroused citizens, government officials, and judges into a dynamic and broad-based political
movement."' 50 Professors Post and Siegel specifically trace originalism's recent ascendancy to the efforts of Attorney General Edwin
Meese, during the administration of President Ronald Reagan, to
"fus[e] conservative activism with the idea of originalism."' 15 1 "No
politically literate person," they write, "could miss the point that the
Reagan Administration's use of originalism marked, and was meant to
mark, a set of distinctively conservative objections to the liberal precedents of the Warren Court.'

52

When one examines originalists' claim that the ratified texts'
demands remain static until those texts have been amended pursuant
to Article V, and that properly adjudicated cases are those in which
judges' rulings are determined either by the texts' original meanings
or by the intentions of the texts' Framers, one thus finds oneself confronted with a fiction. Originalists certainly do approve of many of
the outcomes produced by originalism's methods. At its core, however, that approval is commonly based not on the fact that originalism's methods were employed, but rather on the fact that the
outcomes produced are consistent with originalists' own values.
When a single-minded focus on original intentions or original meanings points in sufficiently undesirable directions, originalists often are
willing to permit judges to look elsewhere for guidance.

148 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of ConstitutionalDecision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1073 (2006) (observing thatJustices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, both of whom endorse originalism, perceive
remarkable similarities between their own values and those of the founding
generation).
149 Horwitz, supra note 87, at 70.
150 Post & Siegel, supra note 130, at 549.

151
152

Id. at 550.
Id. at 554-55.
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The Fictive Quality of Living Constitutionalism

Like many of their originalist counterparts, many living constitutionalists claim fidelity to the second component of the myth of the
written Constitution-the belief that judges' constitutional rulings
should be grounded in the will of the American people as expressed
in the formally ratified texts. 153 As I have noted, however, proponents
of living constitutionalism have a very different understanding of what
it means to say that a judge has properly ascertained the textually
expressed will of the American people.1 54 Living constitutionalists do
not purport to consider themselves bound by original intentions or
original meanings, and thus do not contend that the ratified texts'
requirements remain static until those texts have been formally
amended. If changes in the nation's circumstances suggest that the
ratified texts should be assigned meanings that differ from the meanings assigned to those texts in the past, living constitutionalists
155
encourage judges to alter their interpretations accordingly.
Despite this interpretive flexibility, living constitutionalists who
adhere to the myth of the written Constitution insist that textual interpretation is indeed courts' core constitutional function. The claim
that the ratified texts are the central driving force in proper constitutional adjudication is just as false when the living constitutionalist
makes it, however, as it is when made by the originalist.
In claiming that they give adjudicative primacy to the formally
ratified texts, proponents of living constitutionalism face at least two
problems. First, when they disclaim fidelity both to the intentions of
the texts' Framers and to the original meanings of the texts themselves, living constitutionalists simultaneously disclaim the traditional
rationale for treating the fact of a text's ratification as the dispositive
reason for raising that text to the status of fundamental law. When
the American people debate a text's merits and then elevate it to constitutional status using a supermajoritarian voting process, there are
only two sensible ways to determine what it is about that text that
prompted the American people to add it to the nation's sacred canon:
one can try to ascertain the intentions of those who wrote and ratified
the text, or one can try to ascertain the objective meaning of the text
at the time of its ratification. 156 If one is instead free to ascribe to a
ratified text whatever meaning one thinks is reasonable, then there is
153

See Reich, supra note 86, at 735.

154

See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (describing living constitu-

tionalism).
155 See Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1743.
156 See Fish, supra note 81, at 1114-15.
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no obvious reason to treat the text's ratification as a legally significant
event. That is not necessarily a serious problem, of course, if one is
willing to concede that the nation's Constitution consists of much
more than the formally ratified texts, that the nation's Constitution
frequently has been amended by means other than those specified in
Article V, and that formal ratification thus is not the sine qua non of
fundamental law that it traditionally has been thought to be.157 But it
certainly is a problem if one wishes to insist upon the literal truth of
the two claims of the myth of the written Constitution.
Second, and relatedly, if the ratified texts' meanings are fluid,
and interpreters thus are free to attach new meanings to those texts
whenever a change in beliefs or circumstances suggests such a change
is appropriate, then the driving force in constitutional adjudication is
not the ratified texts, but rather the interpreters' own judgments
about the optimal content of individual rights and the optimal contours of desirable government. 158 As Michael McConnell argues, if
the meanings one ascribes to the ratified texts are determined by
one's present-day judgments "about what is good, just, and efficient,"
then the ratified texts are "only a makeweight," invoked when convenient, but never deemed absolutely essential.' 5 9 Stanley Fish asks living constitutionalists a question that cuts to the heart of the matter: if
one's interpretation of the ratified texts is guided by
the needs and perspective of the current generation of interpreters ....

why bother with the text of the Constitution (or any text) at

all? Why not take the shorter route and just enact statutes that
reflect your will and be done with it? The proponents of the 'living
Constitution' or the 'dynamic Constitution' or the 'best that can be
Constitution' are not urging another form of interpretation; they
are urging its abandonment by removing from it any constraint
whatsoever.1

60

Consider, for example, two of the most important developments
in American constitutionalism over the past century: the emergence
157 See supra Part LA (arguing that the nation's Constitution consists of more than
the formally ratified texts); cf. FALLON, supra note 42, at 18-19 (arguing that the ratified texts' status as law depends not on the fact that they were ratified, but rather on
the fact that we accept them as law); id. at 19 ("Once it is recognized that the Constitution's status as law depends on practices of acceptance, the claim that the written
Constitution (as originally understood) is the only valid source of norms of constitutional interpretation loses all pretense of self-evident validity.").
158 See Fish, supra note 81, at 1115.
159 Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past,66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1998).

160

Fish, supra note 81, at 1114-15 (footnote omitted).
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of the doctrines of incorporation and substantive due process. With
respect to the doctrine of incorporation, it is generally accepted that
the Bill of Rights originally imposed restraints only on the federal government.1 6 1 Since the early twentieth century, 162 however, the
Supreme Court has determined that many of the Bill of Rights' provisions are incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 163 so that those provisions are binding on federal and
state officials alike. 164 Scholars have vigorously debated whether the
doctrine of incorporation can be discovered in the Fourteenth
Amendment's original meaning or in the subjective intentions of that
Amendment's Framers, and whether that doctrine is better grounded
in the Amendment's Due Process Clause or in the Amendment's declaration that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." 165 Some have insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment incor161
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) ("These amendments
contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments."); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 339

(16th ed. 2007) ("The Bill of Rights originally guaranteed individual liberties only
against the federal government.").
162 The Court set the stage for the incorporation doctrine in 1908, observing in
dictum that "it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first
eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state
action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law." Twining v.
NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
163 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ....

164

").

See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that the Fifth

Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the states); Gitlow v. New York, 268

U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (declaring the assumption that the First Amendment's protections of free speech and a free press apply to the states). Today, all but a small handful of the Bill of Rights' provisions have been deemed applicable to the states. See
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 161, at 360 (identifying the unincorporated rights).
165 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. On the Court, the debate was famously framed
by Justice Felix Frankfurter, who argued that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates some, but not necessarily all, of the Bill of Rights' provisions, and Justice Hugo

Black, who argued that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights in
its entirety. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62-67 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (endorsing selective incorporation); id. at 71-75 (Black, J., dissenting)
(endorsing total incorporation). The academic literature on the incorporation doctrine is enormous, but several treatments are widely regarded as classics in the field.
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 155-74 (2d ed. 1997) (rejecting
the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to incorporate the Bill
of Rights); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 2 (1986) (positing that

the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause incorporates the Bill
of Rights); William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the

ConstitutionalLimitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 9-21 (1954) (defend-
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porates some or all of the Bill of Rights' provisions, while others have
insisted that it does not.1 66 As the existence of such debates suggests,
the Amendment's incorporation demands, if any, are far from obvious. It is difficult to believe, however, that the nation's adherence to
the incorporation doctrine turns on whether the doctrine is textually
prescribed. Most Americans-laypeople and lawyers alike-develop
an attachment to the incorporation doctrine (even if they do not
know it by that name) not because they have read the Due Process
Clause and find themselves pushed clearly in that direction, but rather
because they first make the judgment that the nation's fundamental
law ought to place comparable restrictions on state and federal officials with respect to certain individual rights. 167 It is only after making
that determination that one typically tries to find a plausible way to
168
ground that conclusion in the ratified texts.
To a large extent, that is the analytic sequence that even the
Supreme Court has followed. When deciding whether a right articulated in the Bill of Rights is enforceable against the states, the Court
has asked whether the given right is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," whether liberty and justice "would exist if [that right]
were sacrificed," and whether a right seems part of the "'fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions.' "169 If the Court believes that a particular right
should be deemed fundamental, then it grafts that belief onto the text
and deems the right incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment; if
the Court does not believe that a given right should be deemed fundamental, then it reaches the contrary conclusion and declares that
ing Justice Black's contention that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights in its entirety); Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (providing
a seminal examination of the historical record and rejecting Justice Black's contention that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to incorporate the Bill
of Rights in its entirety).
166 See supra note 165 (citing classic entries in the incorporation debate).
167 See Raoul Berger, Incorporationof the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 436 (1981); cf. BLACK, supra note 39, at 95 (arguing that the First Amendment's protection of the freedom of speech would have been
deemed applicable to the states even "without any supporting text").
168 Berger, supra note 167, at 435-36 (arguing that those who endorse incorporation do not genuinely begin their analysis with the Fourteenth Amendment's text, but
instead "reason[] back from" what they believe is the most desirable result); id. at 466
("Those who ... insist upon judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the
states premise that the results are so laudable that they must perforce be
constitutional.").
169 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-28 (1937) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
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enforcing the right against the states is not textually authorized. 170 In
either case, the dispositive question is whether the Court believes the
right should be deemed fundamental. The Court turns to the text
to try to
only when it is prepared to declare its answer and wishes
7
express that answer in textually appropriate language.' '
The same analytic pattern underlies the related development of
the doctrine of substantive due process, through which the nation's
courts have declared the existence of unenumerated rights that
receive strong protection from governmental intrusion.1 72 Although
the term privacy does not appear anywhere in the ratified texts, for
example, the modern Court has found that citizens do possess constitutionally protected privacy rights. Some of the Court's privacy rulings (such as those concerning abortion 17 3 and sodomy 1 74 ) are

175
controversial, while others (such as those concerning contraception
and forced sterilization 1 76 ) appear to enjoy a broad degree of public
acceptance. Of course, all of those rulings share an equally tenuous
relationship with the language of the ratified texts-the Court quickly
backed away from its initial effort to give the right to privacy a textual
anchor through the notion of "penumbras,"'177 and the Court's cur-

170 See Berger, supra note 167, at 465-66 (stating that Justices decide most cases
based on their "gut" and then use reason to support that conclusion).
171 Id.
172 See Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. Rrv. 941, 942
("Advocates of a living Constitution have not hesitated to find in due process a source
of evolving rights to cope with evolving problems of modern society, while critics have
treated substantive due process as a textually unwarranted judicial gloss on the Constitution." (footnote omitted)). See generally James W. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful
Trade or Avocation": The Evolution of UnenumeratedEconomic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 917, 929-49 (2006) (discussing the early emergence of the
doctrine of substantive due process in economic settings).
173 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (holding that a pregnant woman
has a limited, privacy-based right to obtain an abortion).
174 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (striking down a state law
that criminalized consensual homosexual sodomy between adults).
175 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that married couples have a privacy-based right to use
contraception).
176 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating, in a case decided
on equal protection grounds, that those who are forcibly sterilized are "forever
deprived of a basic liberty").
177 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (stating that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance," and that some of those textually enumerated "guarantees
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rent effort to affiliate the privacy right with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' Due Process Clauses 178 is bedeviled by the fact that
179
those clauses facially appear to address only procedural matters.
The ultimately dispositive factor in these rulings (and in citizens'
choices about which of these rulings to contest and which to
embrace) is not the ratified texts, but rather an assessment of whether
a certain right ought to be protected because one perceives it to be
especially fundamental.' 8 0
In the end, therefore, originalists and living constitutionalists frequently are driven by the same impulse: the desire to ensure that the
Constitution's demands square with their own deeply rooted convictions about the rights that citizens hold and the ways that government
officials should and should not be permitted to behave. Of course,
those who claim fidelity to the myth of the written Constitution cannot confess to the charge; they cannot openly embrace Thomas Grey's
contention, for example, "that the courts do appropriately apply values not articulated in the constitutional text, and appropriately apply
create zones of privacy"). But see Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (distancing itself from the
notion of penumbras and opting to tether the right to privacy to due process).
178 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . ."); id. amend. XIV ("No State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ... "); see
also, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (grounding the existence of "a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter"
in the Due Process Clause).
179 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 ("Although a literal reading of the Clause might
suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of
liberty, for at least 105 years ... the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well, one 'barring certain government actions regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them." (quoting Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986))). Critics charge the Court with ascribing meaning to the
Due Process Clause that the text simply will not bear. See, e.g., ROBERT BORx, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERIcA

32 (1990) ("It is clear that the text of the due process clause

simply will not support judicial efforts to pour substantive rather than procedural
meaning into it.").
180 See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv.
703, 705 (1975) [hereinafter Grey, Unwritten Constitution] (stating that a willingness to
decide constitutional cases based upon norms derived from sources other than the
ratified texts "tacitly underlies much of the affirmative constitutional doctrine developed by the courts over the last generation"). See generally Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1984) (arguing that, when a person insists
that all legitimate constitutional law is derived from the formally ratified texts, the
person "begins to justify in textual terms results that so little follow from any ordinary
meaning of the words that critics increasingly see not interpretation of any kind, but
concealed legislation").
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them in determining the constitutionality of legislation."' 81 Nevertheless, disputants and adjudicators frequently do settle upon the outcomes they believe are appropriate before they encounter the ratified
texts, and then search for the interpretive methodologies that will best
allow them both to square their constitutional understandings with
those texts and to invoke those texts when trying to persuade others to
adopt those constitutional understandings as their own. 18 2 The contention that the outcomes in properly adjudicated constitutional cases
are always determined by the textually expressed will of the American
people is simply false.
II.

THE MYTH AS TRUTH

If the two claims composing the myth of the written Constitution
are not literally true, why does the myth continue to find such frequent expression in Americans' constitutional debates? Why do
Americans persist in professing that the formally ratified documents
compose the entirety of their Constitution, when those texts actually
do only a small portion of the nation's constitutional work? Why do
so many Americans continue to assert that strict constructionism or
some other variety of originalism is the only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, when those same Americans frequently
reject the outcomes that an honest application of originalist methods
would yield? Why do living constitutionalists continue to insist upon
their fidelity to the ratified texts, if those texts often are not the source
of the meanings that living constitutionalists ascribe to them?
The myth's prevalence cannot be attributed to ignorance on the
part of all who espouse its literal truth.18 3 After all, judges and constitutional scholars who are well acquainted with the ratified texts' limi181 Grey, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 180, at 705.
182 Cf STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 365 (1980) ("In short, we try
to persuade others to our beliefs because if they believe what we believe, they will, as a
consequence of those beliefs, see what we see (in a particular text]."); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 123, at 1078 (observing that many Americans "tend to associate the
Constitution with whatever they regard as most right and just"); Jeremy Waldron, Do
Judges Reason Morally?, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION 38, 64 (Grant Huscroft ed.,
2008) (stating that disputants in constitutional cases typically purport to draw their
conclusions from the ratified texts, but will not admit what "is obvious: The bland
rhetoric of the Bill of Rights was designed simply to finesse the very real and reasonable disagreements that are inevitable among people who take rights seriously for long
enough to see the Bill enacted").
183 See Gregory Casey, The Supreme Court and Myth: An EmpiricalInvestigation,8 L. &
Soc'y REv. 385, 408 (1974) (stating that the results of the author's survey indicated
that "respondents most knowledgeable about judicial decisions are most rather than
least likely to mythify the Court").
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tations often are as likely as laypeople to invoke the myth and its

accompanying rhetoric. Of course, one might hypothesize that those
judges and scholars invoke the myth-despite its fictive qualitiesbecause they value the power they wield when they are able to convince a credulous public that the formally ratified texts dictate adjudicative outcomes that correspond to the outcomes that those judges
and scholars themselves favor.' 8 4 After all, the American people's
profound reverence for the ratified texts does render them susceptible to text-centered forms of argument.1 85 Although the myth's rhetorical power surely does contribute to the myth's continuing vitality,
there is far more to the story than that.
As is the case with many myths in this and other societies, the
myth of the written Constitution persists in large part because there
are senses in which it is true and valuable.' 8 6 As Walter Murphy
observes, "[m]agic and mythology cannot long survive .. . if they do
not seem to contain some truth and do not in fact perform a useful
function. 1 87 The specific reasons for the persistence of the myth of
the written Constitution may be grouped into two categories. First,

the myth eases the tension between seemingly conflicting beliefs to
which the American people are paradoxically committed. Second,
the myth reflects and reinforces Americans' convictions about their
origins and national identity.
A.

Easing the Tension Between Conflicting Commitments

A myth sometimes is the product of a community's commitment
to two or more seemingly conflicting beliefs-the myth can alleviate
the tension between the paradoxical commitments and help the com184 See BARNETr, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that judges and scholars commit "a
fraud on the public" when they interpret the Constitution however they see fit, believing that, "because it is The Constitution [they] are expounding, the loyal but unsophisticated citizenry will follow"); Chemerinsky, supra note 148, at 1076 (arguing that
power-seeking judges continue to speak the language of formalism in an effort to
persuade the public thatjudges' discretion plays little or no role in shaping adjudicative outcomes).
185 Cf Friedman & Smith, supra note 75, at 22 (stating that the Court sometimes
uses originalist rhetoric when issuing rulings that it fears might "arouse public
opinion").
186 See Donald A. Stauffer, The Modern Myth of the Modern Myth, in ENGLISH INSTITUTE ESSAYS: 1947, at 23, 33 (1948) ("A society that possesses myths is a healthy
human society."); supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (noting the truth-bearing
and function-serving value of myths).
187 MURPHY, supra note 18, at 16; cf. PAUL VEYNE, DID THE GREEKS BELIEVE IN THEIR
MyrHs? 84 (Paula Wissing trans., 1988) (stating that the ancient Greeks "cease[d]
believing [in their myths] at the point where their interest in believing end[ed]").

2009]

THE MYTH

OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

1031

munity achieve the objectives at which those commitments are
aimed. 188 To a significant degree, the myth of the written Constitution is the product of two different sets of such commitments. First, it
is a product of Americans' commitment to two beliefs: that the most
morally legitimate form of government is one in which a nation's citizenry is that nation's ultimate sovereigns and that human beings are
innately flawed creatures who cannot be trusted to behave in the ways
that they should. Second, the myth is a product of Americans' paradoxical commitment to both self-rule and judicial supremacy.
1. Reconciling Self-Rule with Moral Fallibility
In certain respects, the American people's commitment to popular sovereignty is not as thoroughgoing as one might superficially presume.18 9 At the national level, there are no means by which ordinary,
unelected citizens can place their hands directly on the levers of governmental power. Popular referenda and initiatives, for example,
remain entirely creatures of state and local governments. 19 0 Citizens
do not directly cast the decisive votes for the presidency and vice presidency, 19 1 they do not directly select the members of the federal judiciary, 19 2 they do not directly vote on whether to amend the nation's
formally ratified constitutional texts, 193 and it was not until the early
188 See FITZPATRICK, supra note 5, at 24 (stating that myths often are "about the
resolution of inconsistencies, the resolution of opposition"); cf VEYNE, supra note 187,
at 84 ("The coexistence of contradictory truths in the same mind is ... a universal
fact."); Stauffer, supra note 186, at 34 (observing that myths often flourish because
they reflect a society's "profound conviction[s] and satisfy the impossible desires of
that culture").
189 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC Is THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 15-20 (2d ed. 2003) (identifying ways in which the texts ratified by the founding generation were undemocratic). Indeed, the term democracy did not finally shed
all of its negative connotations until the mid-twentieth century. See Horwitz, supra
note 87, at 58-61 (describing the traditional preference for a republican form of
government rather than direct democracy).
190 See DuVivier, supra note 134, at 823, 864 (observing that the United States is
one of the world's few democracies whose citizens have never been permitted to vote
on initiatives or referenda at the national level).
191 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (describing states' appointment of "Electors" to
cast ballots in presidential elections); id. amend. XII (describing the casting and
counting of electors' ballots).
192 See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing the President to appoint federal judges "by

and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate").
193 See id. art. V (describing ways in which the formally ratified texts may be
amended); LESTER B.

ORFIELD, THE AMENDING

OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

216

(1942) ("Before we can correctly speak of the people as being sovereign in the United
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twentieth century that they were permitted to vote directly for their
94
representatives in the Senate.'
The American people nevertheless are committed to the proposition that, by claim of moral right, the citizenry is the nation's ultimate
sovereign. 195 To find evidence of that commitment, one need look no
further than the documents that marked the nation's birth. In Common Sense, Thomas Paine's revolution-inspiring essay published in
early 1776, for example, Paine argued that the only legitimate political
leaders were those who had been "empowered by the people"1 9 6 and
that "[a] government of our own is our natural right.'

97

Although he

avoided using the term democracy, knowing the fears that word might
stoke among society's elite, Paine "radically articulated the ideal of
self-government.' 9 8 The signatories to the Declaration of Independence similarly emphasized their conviction that governments
"deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed," that it
is "the Right of the People to alter or abolish [any destructive form of
government], and to institute a new Government ...

as to them shall

seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness,"' 199 and that the
signatories themselves were entitled to declare America's independence from Great Britain "by the Authority of the good People of
these Colonies."

20 0

Counterpoised against this insistence on citizens' sovereignty is
the deep-seated conviction that human beings often cannot be trusted
to behave in a morally praiseworthy manner. That conviction has
both religious and secular dimensions. In the religious realm, for
example, the Christian doctrine of original sin holds that human
beings have an ineradicable tendency to engage in morally condemnable conduct. 20 1 Although its contours have shifted over time, many
States, we must amend the Constitution so as to permit a majority of the electorate of
the entire country to amend the Constitution.").
194 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (requiring the popular election of senators).
195 See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793) (stating that,
upon the issuance of the Declaration of Independence, "the sovereignty of [America]
passed to the people of it").
196

THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in COMMON SENSE, RIGHTS OF

MAN, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 3, 37 (Signet Classics 2003).

197 Id. at 38.
198 HARVE'J. KAYE, THOMAS PAINE AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 43 (2005); see also
id. at 56 (stating that many of society's leaders had "grave reservations about the popular politics and democratic aspirations of the working classes").
199 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
200 Id. para. 31.
201 See Genesis 3:1-21 (recounting the story of Adam and Eve succumbing to temptation and thereby incurring the deity's condemnation of humanity).

200o9]

THE MYTH

OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

1033

Americans have embraced that doctrine, from the days of the Great
Awakening in the early eighteenth century to the present. 20 2 In the
secular realm, extending back well before the United States' Founding, one finds frequent acknowledgements of humanity's moral fallibility. In the sixteenth century, for example, Niccol6 Machiavelli
observed that "[a] 11 writers on politics have pointed out . . .that in
constituting and legislating for a commonwealth it must ... be taken
for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent
20 3
to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers."
David Hume picked up that same theme in the eighteenth century,
observing that "[p] olitical writers have established it as a maxim, that,
in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks
and controls of the Constitution, every man ought to be supposed a
knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private
interest."204
In deciding how best to distribute the new nation's political
power, the delegates to the 1787 Convention were keenly aware of
people's moral unreliability. 20 5 As Michael McConnell points out, the
"idea that government must be created in recognition of the sinfulness of mankind pervades The FederalistPapers."20 6 In his FederalistNo.
10, for example, James Madison argued that representative forms of
government are superior to direct democracies because people inevitably tend toward factions, by which Madison meant "a number of citizens . . .who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
202

See H.

SHELTON SMITH, CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF ORIGINAL SIN,

at ix-x

(1955) (providing an overview of the doctrine's development in America between the
Great Awakening and the twentieth-century writings of theologians Reinhold Niebuhr
and Paul Tillich); TATHA WILEY, ORIGINAL SIN 3-9, 305-08 (2002) (providing an overview of the doctrine, from its roots in Judaic texts to modern-day Christian teachings).
203 1 THE DISCOURSES OF NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI 216-17 (Leslie J. Walker trans.,
Yale Univ. Press 1950) (1532); see also id. at 234 ("[M]en are more prone to evil than
to good.").
204 DAVID HUME, OF THE INDEPENDENCY OF PARLIAMENT (1742), in 1 ESSAYS MORAL,
POLITICAL, AND LITERARY, supra note 116, at 117-18.
205 See generally Frank Goodman, Mark Tushnet on Liberal ConstitutionalTheory: Mission Impossible, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2259, 2303 (1989) (book review) (stating that "[t]he
image of human nature as passionately selfish and greedy for wealth and power long
antedated liberalism" and that "[g]enerations of Protestant churchgoers on both
sides of the Atlantic needed no reminder from Thomas Hobbes of the failings of
fallen man").
206

Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in

CHRISTIAN PERSPECrIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 5, 7 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds.,

2001).
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permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 207 Like
Machiavelli and Hume before him, Madison believed that people
ordinarily behave selfishly when given the chance to do so: "If the
impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide," he wrote, "we
well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as
20 8
an adequate control."
There plainly is tension between the beliefs that people are
innately prone to act in evil ways and that people are morally entitled
to govern themselves. 20 9 Indeed, some have cited that very tension as
a reason to reject democratic forms of government. During the
English Civil War in the mid-1600s, for example, royalist Sir Robert
Filmer argued that subjects were not entitled to overthrow monarchs
they found unacceptable. He opened his essay Patriarchawith the
declaration that those who believed people were free to choose their
own form of government were forgetting "that the desire for liberty
was the cause of the fall of Adam." 2 10 Filmer argued that God had
assigned similar duties to fathers and kings, charging fathers with the
duty to care for their families and kings with the duty to care for their
commonwealths-and just as children cannot choose their own
fathers, subjects cannot choose their own kings. 21' Even wanting to
207 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 105, at 78.
208 Id. at 81; THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 105, at 322 ("If
men were angels, no government would be necessary."). The founding generation's
primary solution was to establish a representative form of government, with power
distributed among multiple branches that could jealously guard against any one
branch aggrandizing itself at the expense of the others. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison), supra note 105, at 81-84; THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison),
supra note 105, at 322 ("Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."). See generally HUME, supra note 116, at 118 (arguing that political architects must find ways to
make people, "notwithstanding [their] insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to
public good"); Patrick M. O'Neil, Bible in American Constitutionalism, in RELIGION

AND

29, 29 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000) ("The story of
the Fall of Man in Genesis with its attendant dogma of Original Sin was something
that would have lent strong weight to the notion of the need for checks and balances
in government, because the best of statesmen would be seen as flawed and imperfect
beings ....");Goodman, supra note 205, at 2304 (arguing that "nearly all politically
conscious Americans" at the time of the Founding believed that "checks and balances" were the appropriate remedy for the fact "that unchecked power would be
abused and turned to private ends").
209 Cf Ted G. Jelen, Book Review, 35 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 454, 456 (1996)
(reviewing RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE) ("If one's [political] opponents [in a democracy] are arguil.g from a perspective judged to be sinful and corrupt, why is it necessary to deal directly with their arguments?").
210 ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA (1680), reprinted in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 2 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
211 See id. at 12-13.
AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
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govern oneself, Filmer contended, was evidence of one's inherent
2 12
moral weakness.
The myth of the written Constitution helps to ease the tension
between Americans' beliefs in their moral fallibility and in their right
to govern themselves. To see how that it so, consider the way in which
many religions use ancient texts: believing that morally flawed
humans cannot create any worthy religious framework on their own,
they anchor their faith to ancient documents, assign those texts sacred
origins, and purport to find in those texts decisive guidance for dealing with modern life's many complex problems. 2 13 Many Americans
similarly anchor their civic faith to the formally ratified constitutional
texts, assign those texts extraordinary origins, and believe that properly behaving judges can find in those texts-at one level of abstraction or another-the answers to the nation's complex constitutional
questions. 2 14 Because the formally ratified texts are seen as the people's documents, the myth of the written Constitution enables Americans to regard themselves as self-governed; because those texts are
seen as having been written (perhaps with divine guidance 21 5 ) by
heroic figures of unusual brilliance, the myth enables Americans to
believe that those texts transcend the ordinary moral unreliability of
citizens and their leaders.
In that respect, those who wrote and ratified the nation's revered
constitutional texts have the singular advantage of being long since
dead. Their everyday humanity is so far from view-their prejudices,
their temperaments, their vanities and insecurities, their voices, their
physical appearances-that they are easily elevated to the status of
mythic national heroes who were far wiser than anyone today could
hope to be. 216 As Christopher Tiedeman noted, "the national habit is

to look upon the members of the convention of 1787 as demigods,
212 Cf id. at 24 (stating that the only good thing about democracies was "that they
continued but a small time").
213 See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 869-70 (John Bowker ed.,
1997) (noting numerous religions' ascription of extraordinary origins to sacred texts
and reliance upon those texts for guidance in modern life).
214 Cf Harold J. Berman, Religious Foundationsof Law in the West: An HistoricalPerspective, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 3, 31 (1983) ("The Calvinist doctrine of original sin ...
supported the idea of a written constitution, which in effect embodied the social contract and made it, by virtue of the writing, more difficult to break.").
215 See supranote 107 and accompanying text (noting Madison's assertion in Federalist No.. 37 of divine guidance in the Revolution of 1776 and the Convention of
1787).
216 See Stauffer, supra note 186, at 28 (observing that Presidents are more easily
mythologized the further they recede into the past).
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giant heroes, far surpassing the foremost men of today." 2 17 If we
could transport ourselves backward in time, however, and listen as the
members of the founding generation debated the constitutional issues
they faced-if we could concretely experience all of the ways in which
their world and outlook were radically different from our own, beginning with their acceptance of slavery and their denial of the franchise
to women-we might find ourselves far less inclined to insist that all of
the answers to the nation's constitutional questions are enshrined in
the texts that they and their successors wrote and ratified. We might
find ourselves agreeing with Jon Elster that one cannot draw a sharp
distinction between the framers of a constitution and ordinary politicians, assuming that the former are free of the kinds of interests,
biases, and passions that afflict the latter.2 1 8 Given the distance in
time that separates us from the founding generation, however, we are
able to imagine the Framers as geniuses whose every utterance
rewards the closest scrutiny. 21 9 So long as we remain tethered to those
revered texts, the myth of the written Constitution tells us, we will be
truly and safely self-governed notwithstanding our moral flaws.
2.

Reconciling Self-Rule with Judicial Supremacy

While Americans commonly embrace the belief that the formally
ratified texts provide the people's answers to the nation's ever-changing constitutional questions, they recognize that those texts demand
interpretation. 220 There is little doubt today about where the nation
ordinarily locates the supreme interpretive power. The U.S. Supreme
Court has asserted that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, '

22

and the rest of the nation has,

217 TIEDEMAN, supra note 37, at 21; cf Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1299 (1937) ("When the Americans began seeing the revolutionary heroes in the hazy light of semi-divinity and began getting them associated or
confused with the framers of the Constitution, the work of consolidating the new
government was assured.").
218 SeeJoN ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 172-73 (2000) (arguing that framers are no
more immune to political pressures than other politicians); see also id. at 172 ("The
idea that framers are demigods legislatingfor beasts is a fiction.").
219 Cf Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1802 (observing that some judges today "endlessly debate the meaning of. the merest jottings from the Founding and
Reconstruction").
220 See FRED RODELL, NINE MEN 7 (1955) (stating that "even non-lawyers have
come to find a trifle naive" the notion that the Court is like "a nine-headed calculating machine, intricately adjusted to the words of the Constitution and of lesser laws,
and ready to give automatic answers to any attorneys who drop their briefs in the
proper slot and push the button").
221 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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for the most part, happily acquiesced. 222 As scholars have long recognized, however, there is tension between the claims that the citizenry
is the nation's ultimate sovereign and that unelected, life-tenured
judges ultimately determine whether a given governmental action is
valid or void. 22 3 By positing that properly behaving judges rely upon

the formally ratified texts to determine whether the government's
behavior in a given instance is legally permissible, the myth of the
written Constitution helps to resolve that conflict. Viewing the nation
through the myth's lens, judges are not running afoul of the people's
will when they declare that elected officials have behaved unconstitutionally. To the contrary, they are vindicating the people's wishes by
224
enforcing the dictates of the formally ratified texts.
222 See NEAL DEVINS & Louis FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5 (2004)
("Newspapers and constitutional law texts typically treat Court interpretations of the
Constitution as supreme."); Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1594, 1637-39 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004))
(arguing that, although citizens sometimes disagree with the Supreme Court's rulings, they widely accept judicial supremacy). Of course, that acquiescence has not
been absolute. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4
(2000)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (expressly
disapproving of the Supreme Court's construction of the Free Exercise Clause in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and seeking to restore the construction advanced by the Court in an earlier era); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (examining the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and holding that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not authorize Congress to reject the Court's determination of
"what constitutes a constitutional violation"); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 161, at
23-25 (reviewing various Presidents' assertions of interpretive authority).
223 This, of course, is the famous "countermajoritarian difficulty." See ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (2d ed. 1986) (providing a classic
articulation of the problem); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155-62 (2002)
(examining the development of, and reasons for, scholars' unflagging interest in the
problem); Horwitz, supra note 87, at 63 ("The competing conceptions of democracy
and its relationship to judicial review.., have framed the central debates in American
constitutional theory during the past fifty years.").
224 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 15, at 111 (arguing that when courts employ
originalist methods of constitutional interpretation, judicial review is not countermajoritarian because the courts are enforcing the sovereign people's will); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 123, at 1076 (stating that when courts declare legislation
unconstitutional, they often are not acting in a countermajoritarian fashion because
their rulings "represent[] a temporally extended majority rather than a contemporaneous one"); Barnett, supra note 83, at 643 (arguing that judicial review is not countermajoritarian if one embraces certain originalist theories of constitutional
interpretation).
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Citizens do not always agree with judges' rulings, however, and so
the foregoing reasoning begs a critical question: if the purpose of the
ratified texts is to express the supreme will of the American people,
and if citizens believe that judges' interpretations of those texts are
sometimes mistaken, why don't the people shift the nation's ultimate
interpretive authority to the political domain? In recent years, a number of scholars have urged Americans to do precisely that. Vigorously
opposing judicial supremacy, advocates of "popular constitutionalism"
have argued that wielding the nation's supreme interpretive power is
2 5
one of the chief prerogatives of the nation's sovereign people.
Thus far, however, Americans have shown little inclination to loosen
their attachment to judicial supremacy. 226 Moreover, they continue to
rationalize that attachment by embracing a myth whose claims lack
literal accuracy. 227 By helping to legitimate judicial supremacy, what
deeper objectives is the myth of the written Constitution enabling citizens to achieve?
There are at least three interrelated answers. First, just as concerns about people's moral fallibility prompt Americans to ascribe
extraordinary origins to the nation's ratified texts and to idolize the
individuals who wrote them, 2 28 those same concerns cause Americans

to be skeptical about placing the ultimate power to interpret those
225 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); see also Todd E.
Pettys, Popular Constitutionalismand Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?,
86 WASH. U. L. REv 313, 345-59 (2008) (arguing that if the ultimate power to interpret the ratified texts were shifted from the courts to the political domain, the American people would prove themselves able and willing to distinguish between their longterm fundamental interests and their short-term political desires in the kinds of ways
that constitutionalism demands).

See generally MARK

TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITU-

(arguing that there are reasons to support the
rejection of the general theory ofjudicial supremacy and exploring the idea of populist constitutional law); ADIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 278-79
(2006) (arguing that legislatures should control the evolution of the Constitution
because they represent a "broader range of views, professions, and social classes" than
judges);JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 254-88 (1999) (criticizing various
arguments supporting the view that judicial supremacy is a democratic and desirable
doctrine).
226 See Alexander & Solum, supra note 222, at 1637-39 (arguing that the chief
problem with popular constitutionalism is that, although they sometimes disagree
with particular rulings, Americans appear to embrace judicial supremacy); cf.Barry
Friedman, Mediated PopularConstitutionalism,101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2616-17 (2003)
(stating that social scientists have found that the Supreme Court enjoys a reservoir of
good will among the larger public).
227 See supra Part I (identifying ways in which the claims of the myth of the written
Constitution are not literally accurate).
228 See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text (noting the tendency to view
the Founders as mythic heroes).
TION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)
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texts in the hands of individuals who are transparently politically motivated. Rather than give legislators or executive officials the final word
on whether their own actions are legally permissible, the American
people prefer to confer that power upon politically unaccountable
judges. The nation then invests those judges with the trappings of a
priesthood class, from body-concealing black robes, to elevated
benches, to a specialized language. Harry Stumpf accurately observes
that, by setting judges apart from the rest of the citizenry in such ways,
the American people are able to "sustain the myth of an impersonal
judiciary divining decisions based on some objective truth contained
'229
in the Constitution.
Focusing specifically on judges' "curious" attire, Jerome Frank
makes the same point. 230 By obscuring judges' physicality, he writes,

robes promote the public's image ofjudges as a select class of people
blessed with an almost superhuman capacity to deduce case-specific
answers from the nation's fundamental legal precepts. 23 1 Indeed, to
appreciate the rhetorical power of those black robes, simply imagine
the nation's President beginning to dress in a comparable manner for
such events as press conferences and the annual State of the Union
Address. Although the President might try to justify the choice by
explaining that such attire befits the dignity of the office, he or she
would be mercilessly ridiculed, and not merely because the sight was
unfamiliar. Such modes of dress seem fundamentally incompatible
with the nature of the presidency. Yet if judges today were to cease
wearing those same robes when performing their official duties, many
citizens would find it difficult to reconcile judges' new appearance
with the image that the citizenry wishes to attach to them-the image
of judges as better-than-human individuals who are rarely susceptible
to the kinds of moral and cognitive weaknesses that afflict ordinary
people.
229 HARRY P. STIUMPF, AMERIAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 49 (2d ed. 1998); see also Casey,
supra note 183, at 387 ("Symbols can elevate the [Court], setting it up as special,
remote from ordinary skills and practices, difficult to check against daily experience,
and unapproachable by the common man." (citations omitted)).
230 JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 254 (1949).
231 See id. at 254-57 (exploring the cultural and historical role of judicial robes);
see also MURPHY, supra note 18, at 13 (noting that judges' black robes foster the image
"of the judge as a high priest ofjustice with special talents for elucidation of 'the law,'
that sacred and mysterious text which is inscrutable even to the educated layman");
RODELL, supra note 220, at 28 (stating that a "myth ... deeply imbedded in our folklore of government" is the notion that judges "put on, or should put on, with their
robes a complete impartiality or indifference toward the nation's social and economic

problems").
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Second, although diehard devotees of constitutional law might
find it hard to understand, many citizens have little interest in regularly devoting their energies to political and constitutional disputes.
As political scientists John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse persuasively argue, "people do not like politics even in the best of circumstances; in other words, they simply do not like the process of openly
arriving at a decision in the face of diverse opinions. ''232 Many would
prefer to go about their daily activities without having to worry about
whether their elected leaders are behaving in an honorable fashion.
What typically provokes them to turn their attention to political matters is not an irresistible urge to engage in politics; rather, it is the
suspicion that the political system has become one "in which decision
makers-for no other reason than the fact that they are in a position
to make decisions-accrue benefits at the expense of non-decision
makers." 233 If the people believe they are "being played for a sucker,"
they will energetically search for ways "to get power away from [the]
self-serving politicians." 234 Otherwise, they would prefer to leave the
23 5
tasks of governing to others.

Even when they disagree with particular rulings, Americans
believe that judges are unlikely to decide cases in a manner aimed at
236
making themselves better off at the expense of the larger public.
The American people are fairly confident, in other words, that judges
ordinarily will not behave in the kinds of self-serving ways that cause
citizens to decide that they must temporarily set aside their usual activ232

See

JOHN

R.

HIBBING

&

ELIZABETH

THEISS-MORSE,

STEALTH

DEMOCRACY 3

(2002); see also id. at 1 ("The last thing people want is to be more involved in political
decision-making ....
");Doni Gewirtzman, Gloy Days: PopularConstitutionalism,Nostal-

gia, and the True Nature of ConstitutionalCulture, 93 GEo. L.J. 897, 913 (2005) (citing
the work of Professors Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, among others, for the proposition
that political scientists have been amassing "studies showing that the People have little
interest in increased civic responsibility").
233 HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 232, at 2; see also id. at 159 (stating that
citizens become agitated when they believe that elected officials have made decisions
based upon a desire "to better themselves by securing reelection, by getting a trip to
Maui, by getting rich, or by garnering a major contribution for their campaign
coffers").
234 Id. at 130.
235 See, e.g., HUME, supra note 116, at 453-55 (arguing that individuals often are
more willing than their rhetoric might indicate to allow others to wield political
power over them).
236 See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 232, at 158 ("When the Court permits
criminals to get off on technicalities or radicals to burn the American flag, the public,
by wide margins, believes the decisions to be seriously wrong-headed. But approval of
the Court persists because the situation of the justices themselves has not been
improved by those decisions ....").
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ities and devote their energies to issues of governance. 23 7 As a result,
the citizenry believes that judges, rather than overtly political actors,
are best positioned to resolve constitutional controversies. 238 To the
extent that citizens worry that assigning such weighty responsibilities
to politically unaccountable individuals might conflict with the people's desire to be self-governed, the myth of the written Constitution
provides them with the assurance they need: in the formally ratified
texts, the American people have provided judges with ample guidance
for determining how particular constitutional disputes should be
resolved. 239 Viewed from the myth-holder's perspective, judges ordinarily can be trusted selflessly to enforce the people's textually
expressed constitutional directives.
Third, counterintuitive though it initially might seem, Americans
often find it easier both to regard themselves as self-governed and to
respect decisions about issues of fundamental law when those decisions have been hammered out behind closed doors before being
announced and explained to the larger public. Buoyed by the fiction
that they have textually provided the raw materials for answering the
nation's constitutional questions, the American people would prefer
to believe that ascertaining the answers to those questions is largely a
matter of deducing conclusions from the legal premises that the people have provided. As Professor Murphy explains, many Americans
find it easier to accept "decisions which appear to be the ineluctable
result of rigorously logical deductions from 'the law,' than ...rulings
which are frankly a medley of legal principle, personal preferences,
and educated guesses as to what is best for society." 240 Americans do
not want to see the nation's constitutional decisionmakers frequently
237 In a celebrated essay published three-quarters of a century ago, Max Lerner
observed:
We have somehow managed in our minds to place the judges above the
battle. Despite every proof to the contrary, we have persisted in attributing
to them the objectivity and infallibility that are ultimately attributes only of
godhead. The tradition persists that they belong to no economic group or
class; ... that their decisions proceed through some inspired way of arriving
at the truth; that they sit in their robes like the haughty gods of Lucretius,
high above the plains on which human beings swarm, unaffected by the preferences and prejudices that move common men.
Lerner, supra note 217, at 1311.
238 See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 232, at 158 ("The Supreme Court is
relatively popular not just because the justices hide their internal conflict from public
view but mostly because their decisions are not perceived to affect their own material
well-beings.").
239 See MURPHY, supra note 18, at 16-17.
240 Id. at 17.
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feeling torn between two or more attractive yet incompatible alternatives, vacillating before making a final decision, or suffering any of the
other ailments that often trouble those charged with making difficult
decisions. 24 1 Professor Stumpf puts it well: "[A]fter the tumult, greed,
and indecisiveness of the legislative process ....

we quickly weary of

the frustrations and disappointments of plain old politics and wish to
repair to the serenity, the sureness, indeed the utter sublimity ofjustice, which the law and its purveyors promise. ' 242 Americans make
progress toward those ends by relying upon judges to conduct much
of their decisionmaking work out of the public view.
B. Preservinga Meaningful Sense of Nationhood
Myths frequently take the form of "stories [that] deal with origins
and identity. '243 When a myth concerns the origins or identity of a
nation, it can help foster a deep sense of attachment among the
nation's members, binding them together in service to a perceived
national project. 244

One of the United States' widely embraced

2
nation-building myths is the myth of the written Constitution.

45

241 Cf HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 232, at 158 (stating that the Supreme
Court is popular in part because the Court's members conceal some of their conflicts
from the larger public).
242 STUMPF, supra note 229, at 49; see also Gewirtzman, supra note 232, at 923
("Compared with the heated and contentious rhetoric that often accompanies
national elections and Congressional debate, [the Court] operates as a model of civility. Its decisionmaking procedures are highly circumscribed, with most debate and
horse trading taking place behind closed doors. Norms of professional courtesy and
decorum are well established."). If that means that judges' closed-door decisionmaking processes are sometimes shrouded in mystery, that may only enhance the weight
that Americans ultimately are willing to ascribe to their decisions. See MURPHY,supra
note 18, at 16 (arguing that a public sense of mystery concerning a person's or institution's qualities or decisionmaking processes can enhance that person's or institution's
public prestige).
243

FITZPATRICK, supra note 5, at 15; see also VEYNE, supra note 187, at 80-81 (dis-

cussing the role of myths in describing cities' origins in ancient Greece).
244

See FITZPATRICK,

supra note

5, at 113

("[N]ational

histories were con-

structed... which ...told.., of exclusive origins and identity, of distinct community
and a unique spirit.").
245 Another nation-building myth toward which many Americans have gravitated
since the earliest days of the country's history is the myth that the deity of the Christian religion chose the United States "for a special, redeeming role on the stage of
world history," a role aimed at bringing freedom to "all the peoples of the earth."
HUGHES, supra note 6, at 6-7; see also Todd E. Pettys, Our Anticompetitive Patriotism,39

U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1353, 1370-73 (2006) (describing the prevalence of this myth,
from the speeches of President George Washington to President George W. Bush's
State of the Union Address in 2004).
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Many Americans report that counting themselves as members of
the United States' national community provides them with an important dimension of their individual identities. 24 6 As Kenneth Karst
writes, "membership in the national community helps to provide a
sense of wholeness, not only for the society but also for the citizen's
sense of self."2 47 That sense of membership in a national community
also helps to enhance the perceived legitimacy of national electoral
outcomes. Although a great many Americans surely would have difficulty accepting being outvoted by those in other countries in an international popular election on some important matter, they accept
outcomes in which they have been outvoted in national elections
because they share (and wish to preserve) a strong sense of identity
248
with those who voted differently.
Yet on what do Americans build that shared sense of
nationhood-that sense of solidarity or, as Benedict Anderson
describes it, that sense of "a deep, horizontal comradeship with one
another"?249 Mere possession of legal citizenship is not the answer,
nor is mere presence within the United States' borders-citizenship
and physical presence help to define one's legal relationship with a
jurisdiction, but they never have been the stuff of which nations are
made. Moreover, as a collection of immigrants drawn from far-flung
regions of the world, Americans cannot build a nation on the same
foundations on which nations traditionally have been erected, such as
250
a shared ethnicity or a common geographic origin.
246 See ROBERT N. BELLA ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 250 (1996) (reporting,
after interviews with numerous Americans, that many feel "a widespread and strong
identification with the United States as a national community").
247
248

L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 184 (1989).
Cf Mattias Kumm, Why Europeans Will Not Embrace ConstitutionalPatriotism, 6

KENNETH

INT'LJ. CONST. L. 117, 118-19 (2008) (arguing that if the European Union is to be

able to make binding decisions "on policies that concern the security of its citizens or
that have significant distributive effects, then a sufficiently robust common identity
seems necessary to legitimate the polity and ensure its functioning in the long term").

249 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6-7 (rev. ed. 1991); accordErnest
Renan, What Is a Nation, in BECOMING NATIONAL 42, 53 (Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor
Suny eds., 1996) (stating that to be a nation is to feel "a large-scale solidarity").

250 See HANS KOHN, AMERICAN NATIONALISM 3 (1957) (stating that Americans
"established themselves as a nation without the support of any of those elements that
are generally supposed to constitute a separate nation"); see also

BENJAMIN AKzIN,

8-10 (1964) (stating that the term "nation" usually is used to
denote people of a common ethnicity); EJ. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM
STATE AND NATION
SINCE

1780, at 14-18 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that the term "nation" traditionally

denotes people of a common ethnic descent or people from a common geographic
origin).
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More than anything else, American nationhood is built upon two
professed commitments: a commitment to principles of liberty and
equality, such as one finds in the Declaration of Independence, 251 and
a commitment to work out what those principles mean in specific
cases through appeals to the nation's formally ratified constitutional
texts. 252 As political scientist Thomas Pangle points out, the United
States was "the first nation in history explicitly grounded.., on appeal
to abstract and universal philosophic principles of political right. ' 253
A professed commitment to those principles remains at the heart of
what Gunnar Myrdal called the "American Creed"-"the belief in
equality and in the rights to liberty. '254 Of course, liberty and equality
are highly malleable concepts, demanding elaboration in the fact-specific instances in which they are invoked. While originalists and living
constitutionalists alike bring their own deeply rooted convictions to
bear when determining whether the government has behaved permissibly in a particular case, they also are joined by a determination to try
to reconcile those convictions with, and articulate their arguments in
255
the language of, the formally ratified constitutional texts.
Americans' determination to work within the ratified texts'
parameters is animated by much more than a desire to present consti251 See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.").
252 Cf TRIBE, supra note 14, at 14 (stating that the formally ratified texts "memorialize [] the commitments defining us over the course of time in a way that neither our
physical territory nor the multiple ancestral origins of our nation can"); TUSHNET,
supra note 225, at 31-32 (arguing that when interpreting the nation's ratified texts,
one should take one's guiding principles from the Declaration of Independence,
which lays out "unassailable moral truths" and describes the "project" that "constitutes
us as a people").
253 THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 278 (1988); see also
KOHN, supranote 250, at 8 (stating that America built its sense of nationhood around
"an idea which singled out the new nation among the nations of the earth," namely,
the idea of liberty); Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in THIS
FIERY TRIAL 183, 184 (William E. Gienapp ed., 2002) ("Four score and seven years ago
our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.").
254

GUNNAR MYRDAL,

AN

AMERICAN DILEMMA

8 (20th anniversary ed. 1962); see also

50 (2001) (stating that Americans' devotion to these
principles is what makes them "one people"); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?
46 (2004) ("Americans, it is often said, are a people defined by and united by their
commitment to the political principles of liberty, equality, democracy, individualism,
human rights, the rule of law, and private property embodied in the American
Creed.").
255 See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.

WALTER BERNS, MAKING PATRIOTS
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tutional arguments in a form that others will find persuasive
(although that surely is an incentive). Most fundamentally, it is driven
by Americans' sense of who they are and of what binds them to one
another. 256 By working out the demands of liberty and equality
through appeals to the ratified texts, Americans not only are able to
see themselves as the ideological descendants of the idolized individuals who wrote and ratified those documents, 257 but they are able to
maintain a meaningful sense of nationhood with their contemporaries, as well. 258 As Max Lerner ably put it, "[elvery tribe needs its
totem... and the Constitution is ours." 259 The United States' diverse

population finds unity in the project of trying to assign persuasive
2 60
meanings to their formally ratified constitutional texts.

The myth of the written Constitution contributes to the ratified
texts' nation-building capacities in a number of ways. By positing that
the ratified texts provide the major premises from which all constitutional conclusions ultimately can and must be drawn, the myth gives
256 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalismand Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE LJ. 1943,
2027 (2003) ("[The Constitution] is the compendium of values and commitments
that holds us together despite our diversity and differences.").
257 See Farber, supranote 57, at 1247 (stating that trying to tie one's views to those
of the Framers "is a way of connecting modern decisions to the very formation of our
country, and hence to the American mythos"); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation,"58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551,
563 (1985) (arguing that appealing to the ratified texts is a means of recalling the
Framers' "founding, constitutive aspirations and ...responding to them").
258 See generally FALLON, supranote 42, at 130 ("[O]ur sense of national identity as
a people literally constituted by the Constitution is linked indissolubly with ideals of
common constitutional rights .... [N]ational ideals require national enforcement as
an affirmation of our shared nationhood."); Juirgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a
Constitution, in DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 19, 27 (Erik Oddvar Eriksen
et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that shared participation in democratic processes "establishes an abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers").
259 Lerner, supra note 217, at 1294; see also LEWINSON, supra note 55, at 73 ("[O]ne
reason for the emphasis on reverence for the Constitution ...is the realization that
there may be no other basis for uniting a nation of so many disparate groups."); Post
& Siegel, supra note 256, at 2027 ("From the very founding of the republic, the Constitution has been viewed by Americans as the preeminent and all-encompassing symbol of American nationhood.").

260 Cf AcKERMAN, supra note 97, at 36 ("In part because Americans differ so radically in other respects, our constitutional narrative constitutes us [as] a people. If you
and I did not try to discover meaning in our constitutional history,- we would be cutting ourselves off from each other.... ."); Kumm, supra note 248, at 122 (arguing that
"constitutional patriotism" does not require a full consensus on what a constitution
demands, but does require "a consensus on the vocabulary that is to be used to structure debates about what should be done").
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citizens an argumentative starting point that they can embrace, no
matter what their political viewpoint. 26 1 Casting one's constitutional
arguments in the language of the ratified texts thus becomes a way not
only of trying to persuade one's opponents, but of showing them
respect by appealing to shared premises, as well. 262

Moreover,

because the myth holds that the entirety of the nation's Constitution
was written and adopted by the American people, citizens feel entitled
263
to make claims about what those texts demand in particular cases.
As Reva Siegel observes, the ratified texts are "the site of understandings and practices that authorize, encourage, and empower ordinary
citizens to make claims on the Constitution's meaning. '264 Making
claims about the texts' meaning thus itself becomes an important
means by which one marks and strengthens one's membership in the
26 5
national community.
The myth and the accompanying ability of citizens to make claims
about the ratified texts' meaning also give citizens at least two incentives peacefully to accept constitutional outcomes with which they disagree. First, the myth provides citizens with the context they need for
making face-saving, dignity-preserving concessions to their opponents-after all, it is far easier to declare that one is acquiescing to
outcomes that purport to be rooted in the textually expressed will of
the American people than it is to acquiesce to outcomes that purport
to be rooted in nothing more than the preferences of one's particular
opponents.266 Second, because one might prevail in a debate about a
261 See Strauss, supra note 39, at 907 ("[W] hatever their disagreements, people can
agree that the text of the Constitution is to be respected.").
262 See id. at 908 ("Even among people who disagree about an issue, it is a sign of
respect to seek to justify one's position by referring to premises that are shared by the
others.").
263 See Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitutionfrom a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 322 (2001) (stating that the perception of the

ratified texts as the people's documents empowers citizens to "understand themselves
as authorized to speak to matters involving 'what is officially the law/legal system'
where the Constitution is concerned, in a way that they do not feel authorized to
speak about questions of tort or property law").
264 Id. at 299 (emphasis removed).
265 Cf LEVINSON, supranote 55, at 193 (arguing that a commitment to the nation's
Constitution is not a commitment to "aseries of propositional utterances, [but rather
is] a commitment to taking political conversation seriously"); Kumm, supra note 248,
at 134 ("Citizens' identities are not shaped by constitutional texts, unless the texts
have been the focal point of political and legal contestation and deliberation meaningfully connected to the citizens' collective political action.").
266 See VEYNE, supra note 187, at 80 ("By referring to lofty [myth-based] reasons
instead of making a show of force, one encourages the other to submit willingly and
for honorable reasons, which saves face.").

2009l

THE MYTH

OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

1047

particular text's demands in the future, one has an incentive to reinforce the text's apparent authority by accepting temporary defeat in a
267
debate about that text's demands today.
It is here that the myth's nation-building role is most ironic. If
citizens of diverse persuasions are to believe that those texts provide
the raw material for generating favorable constitutional outcomes,
those texts must indeed be perceived as providing premises around
which a diverse population can rally. If a citizen is deeply dissatisfied
with the outcome produced by a court's interpretation of a particular
text today, she will continue to rally around that text only if she
believes that she may be able to persuade judges and her fellow citizens to interpret it differently tomorrow. 268 Yet the texts are able to
retain their broad appeal to a diverse citizenry only because they are
susceptible to diverse interpretations. 26 9 The texts are able to unite a
diverse population only because they, in fact, do not provide ample
guidance as to how the American people want all constitutional disputes to be resolved. To see the texts as a nation-building force, one
thus cannot say that the job ofjudges is simply to call balls and strikes,
to use Chief Justice Roberts' unfortunate analogy. 270 One must
acknowledge that the ratified texts do not themselves prescribe clear
answers to all of the nation's constitutional controversies, and that
those texts constitute far less than the entirety of the nation's fundamental law. 271 In a very real sense, therefore, the myth of the written
267

See Post & Siegel, supra note 82, at 383 ("The ongoing possibility of shaping

constitutional meaning helps explain why Americans remain faithful to their Constitution even when their constitutional views do not prevail."); see also Louis MICHAEL
SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 8-9 (2001) (arguing that it is important in
constitutional debates to "entic[e the] losers into a continuing conversation").
268 See Siegel, supra note 103, at 1342 ("In the United States, popular confidence
that the Constitution is the People's is sustained by understandings and practices that
draw citizenry into engagement with questions of constitutional meaning and enable
communication between engaged citizens and officials charged with enforcing the
Constitution."). Keith Whittington makes a comparable point concerning the possibility of formally amending the ratified texts. Because such amendments are possible,
he argues, unhappy citizens are invited to continue in the nation's dialogue about the
Constitution's ideal content. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 15, at 150-51.
269 Cf Farber, supra note 57, at 1246 ("The words of the Constitution set the
parameters for constitutional debate but are rarely decisive.").
270 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (recounting Chief Justice Roberts'
use of this analogy during his confirmation hearings).
271 Christopher Tiedeman made a comparable point more than a century ago:
It is, no doubt, convenient for the practical lawyer to accept the fiction that
the judge does not make law; that he simply declares what was the preexisting law; but the critical student of political science repudiates it in the
presence of the undoubted formulation by the courts of principles, never
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Constitution is an effective nation-building device only because it is
false.
CONCLUSION: CONFRONTING THE PREDICAMENT

Our Enlightenment-bred instincts often tell us that, upon discovering beliefs or assumptions that are false, our responsibility is to
expose their fictive qualities and to insist that society not build upon
their unreliable foundations. 272 Fulfilling that responsibility can be
the source of undeniable intellectual pleasure. There can be few
greater joys for the scientist or historian, for example, than discovering that his or her predecessors' assumptions were inaccurate and that
the path of truth leads in a wholly unanticipated direction.
Although legal scholars certainly share in such pleasures, they
also operate in a world in which reliance upon fictions is often
encouraged. Of course, the law does not offer a fiction-creating
license to everyone who finds that their preferences inconveniently
conflict with the facts. Yet as Lon Fuller explained in his classic treatment of the subject, we routinely do use legal fictions "to reconcile a
specific legal result with some premise or postulate." 273 Believing that
it is unfair to punish a person for breaking laws of which they had no
notice but that ignorance of the law should not excuse criminal conduct, for example, we posit (sometimes inaccurately) that criminal
2 74
defendants were aware of the laws they are accused of violating.
Believing that a state's sovereign immunity should not wholly foreclose the possibility of providing meaningful relief when a state
behaves unlawfully, we often draw a fictitious distinction between a
state's officers and the state itself. 275 Believing that a person who

intends to harm one person but instead accidentally harms a
before enunciated, and which in many cases conflict hopelessly with the fundamental principles of the past.
TIEDEMAN, supra note 37, at 44-45.
272 See FITZPATRICK, supra note 5, at 27 ("In modern times... mythology has been
relegated to the fabulous and the false in contrast to reality and to its forms in science
and history .... ).
273 FULLER, supra note 23, at 51.
274 See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) ("Based on the notion
that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person
knew the law. This common-law rule has been applied by the Court in numerous
cases construing criminal statutes.").
275 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997)
(acknowledging that the doctrine of Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), relies upon a
"fiction"); see also Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: FederalInterests and the
Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1137 (1989) ("[T]he Court has simply
called the Young analysis a fiction and persisted in relying on it ....").
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bystander should not escape civil liability for acting with the intent to
cause injury, the common law of intentional torts has long relied
upon the doctrine of transferred intent, an "arrant, bare-faced fiction."2 76 Far from signaling one's naivet6, embracing such fictions
often marks one as an insider, as one who possesses a sophisticated
understanding of the law and of the forces that give the law its shape.
The myth of the written Constitution thus places judges and constitutional scholars in a remarkable predicament. The myth's claims
are not literally true-the nation's Constitution consists of much
more than the formally ratified texts,2 77 and judges frequently produce constitutional outcomes that are widely embraced as properly
decided, even though one cannot reasonably say they were determined by the will of the American people as expressed in those ratified texts. 278 Once one recognizes the fictive nature of the myth's
claims, it can be difficult to indulge constitutional arguments that presume those claims' literal accuracy. On the other hand, it is not clear
what response one should hope to elicit by pointing out the ways in
which those claims are false. After all, the myth helps the American
people achieve objectives to which they are profoundly committed-it
helps to ease the tension between their commitment to self-rule and
their belief in people's moral fallibility; 279 it helps to ease the tension

between their commitment to self-rule and their attraction to judicial
supremacy; 2s0 and it helps to secure the strong sense of nationhood
that so many Americans deeply desire. 28 ' The criminal defense attorney who persuasively argues that her client was not actually aware of
the laws her client is accused of violating is bound to be disappointed
by her audience's response: although you have made us acutely aware
of your client's ignorance, we might say, we have decided to embrace
a contrary fiction. Should those who point out the literal inaccuracy
of the myth of the written Constitution expect anything more?
At least two overarching responses are appropriate-one concerning the modest expectations that reform-minded judges and
scholars should hold when venturing onto the myth's territory, and
the other concerning the important work that judges and scholars
must nevertheless do. With respect to judges' and scholars' expectations, one must recognize that the myth's claims are far too tightly
interwoven with Americans' fundamental commitments to be easily
276 William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REv. 650, 650 (1967).
See supra Part I.A.
278 See supra Part I.B.
279 See supra Part II.A.1.
277

280
281

See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part IIB.

1050

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 84:3

discarded. By serving their insistence upon endorsing popular sovereignty, acknowledging human beings' moral fallibility, embracing
judicial supremacy, and preserving a meaningful sense of nationhood,
the myth of the written Constitution goes a long way toward legitimating and stabilizing the legal regime that many Americans desire.
Those who argue that the myth's claims should be openly rejected are
thus doomed for disappointment unless they carry either of two
weighty burdens: they must demonstrate either that the objectives at
which the myth's claims are aimed are not sufficiently important to
warrant indulging such fictions, or that there are more desirable
means by which those objectives may be achieved.
Those are heavy burdens indeed, particularly when one realizes
that it is not always a pretension to literal truth that causes many to
embrace the myth in the first place. Consider the virtual stalemate
that often prevails in debates about the best methods of interpreting
the nation's formally ratified texts. No matter how many holes
originalists and living constitutionalists poke in one another's theories, they rarely manage to shake one another loose from their fundamental interpretive commitments. 282 One soon begins to perceive
that those interpretive theories draw many of their loyal adherents not
because those theories are seen as laying the strongest claim to literal
truth, but because they are seen as providing the best means by which
those theories' proponents can achieve the adjudicative outcomes
that they believe are appropriate. 28 3 One never encounters originalists or living constitutionalists who regularly lament the outcomes that
their own interpretive methods yield, yet one routinely encounters
originalists and living constitutionalists who are critical of the outcomes produced by the interpretive methods of their opponents.
Similarly, many Americans are committed to the myth of the written
Constitution not because they have examined its claims and judged
them to be literally accurate, but because they value the cognitive and
nation-building work that those claims do. That is not to say that criticizing the myth is pointless; rather, it is to say that criticizing the myth
is unlikely to get one very far unless one takes into account just how
much the myth's proponents perceive to be at stake.
How, then, should judges and scholars proceed? To many modern minds, there might appear to be only one intellectually responsible option-namely, assuming the mantle of demythologization and
282 Cf Post & Siegel, supra note 130, at 570 (arguing that no matter how devastatingly one attacks originalists' methods, originalism will continue to thrive as a tool
used by its proponents).
283 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
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arguing that fictions should be resolutely shunned, no matter what
the costs. After all, aren't we in the modern era defined, at least in
part, by our intrepid willingness to follow the path of literal truth
wherever it leads? To do otherwise, our instincts tell us, we must be
either quaintly unenlightened or culpably deluded.
No matter how powerful our instinct to demythologize, it is not
our only intellectually responsible option, and-given the widely valued functions that the myth ably serves-it might not even be our best
one. Those trained in the law are well positioned to recognize that
embracing fictions cannot be sweepingly denounced-again, the law
is full of fictions that we knowingly endorse without giving them a
second thought, because we value the conceptual work that they
do.2 8 4 Similarly, a community can embrace a mythological story or

belief for its capacity to serve that community's deep commitments,
even though the community knows that the myth's claims are not literally true. 28

5

In the case of the myth of the written Constitution, one

might thus well choose to devote one's energies not to trying to eradicate the myth, but rather to trying to protect it from the kinds of
attacks that, if left unchecked, would undermine its capacity to serve
the functions for which it is so widely embraced.
If we acquiesce to the charge that the myth's claims are not literally true (as I have argued that we must 28 6 ), what are the remaining

attacks against which the myth requires protection? And how can we
provide that protection without abetting an exercise in shameful selfdelusion? In the limited space that remains, I want to propose that
one can at least begin to respond to those difficult questions by developing a line of argument that starts with a source that might initially
seem incongruous-namely, Samuel Taylor Coleridge's early-nineteenth-century musings on poetry. 2 7 At one point in his career,
Coleridge set out to write a series of poems in which "the incidents
and agents were to be, in part at least, supernatural," with the ambition of provoking in the reader "such emotions, as would naturally
accompany such

situations,

supposing them real." 28

8

Coleridge

summed up his challenge in language that introduced a new phrase
into our cultural vocabulary: he believed he would have to write
poems that would "transfer from our inward nature a human interest
284
285
286
287

See supra notes 22-23, 273-76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 6-12, 186-87 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
See COLERIDGE, supra note 24, at 5-6 (introducing the pertinent concepts).

288

Id. at 5.
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and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of
the imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment,
which constitutes poetic faith."2 89 When we choose to suspend our disbelief, one commentator later explained, we relax "the sinews ordinarily strung for the effort of criticism, [and] we relapse into an easy
acceptance of a delightful thing." 290 Something akin to poetic faith
may be precisely what the myth of the written Constitution requires.
We frequently are deeply moved-sometimes even transformed-by poems, novels, plays, films, and other artistic creations,
even though we know they are not literally all that they purport to be:
the images are manufactured, the plot is constructed, the characters
are played by actors, and so forth. By suspending our ordinary dismissal of those things that are not literally true, we find that artists are
able to stir chords deep within us, causing us to see the world in more
profoundly truthful ways. Similarly, the Christian theologians I
described at the outset-those who do not believe Jesus was literally
divine, but who find that asserting Jesus' divinity is "a mythological or
poetic way of expressing his significance" 29 1-are suspending their
disbelief in order to reach what is, for them, a deeper truth. In both
the secular and sacred realms, poetic faith often is aimed not at avoiding the truth, but rather at finding deeper ways of perceiving and
expressing it. The willingness to suspend one's disbelief in order to
achieve some larger objective is not the mark of one who is pre-modern; it is the mark of one who is human.
Poetic faith is difficult to exercise, however, when at the same
time that one is trying to suspend one's disbelief one is powerfully
reminded of the ways in which one's experiences are grounded in
fictions. In the world of literature, for example, a novel's resonance
can be fatally thwarted by dialogue that rings false or a plot twist that
does not plausibly flow from the events that preceded it. A scene in a
film that we ordinarily would find deeply compelling would be considerably less so if, while viewing the scene, the film's director were whispering in our ear about how the scene was constructed. Those
Christian theologians who poetically assert that Jesus was divine, but
do not believe the claim is literally true, surely would find the myth
harder to embrace if they regularly encountered evidence that
seemed irreconcilable with a literal ascription of divinity. Like poems,
289 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
290 E.T. Campagnac, Make-Believe, 24 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 213, 214 (1924);
see also id. at 215 (defining "poetic faith" as "a faith which creates and for a time
maintains the conditions in which its objects can live and have their being").
291 Hick, supra note 11, at ix.
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novels, films, and plays, a myth need not be literally accurate in order
to be the object of poetic faith, but neither can it appear patently
contrived.
For Americans to embrace the myth of the written Constitution,
therefore, they must find themselves reasonably able to suspend their
disbelief in the myth's propositions. That does not mean that they
must achieve the metaphysical impossibility of simultaneously believing and disbelieving the same claims, any more than the person wishing to be transformed by reading a novel or confessing a religious
creed must do that which cannot be done. Rather, poetic faith
demands that when Americans encounter the realms in which constitutional meanings are shaped, they do not find that the claims made
by the myth of the written Constitution are so utterly implausible that
they cannot be embraced even for their mythological value. If the
fictive qualities of the myth's claims are regularly and powerfully
underscored by the way in which the nation's courts and scholars do
business-if the ratified texts' lack of adjudicative primacy is repeatedly shoved to the forefront of the public's attention-the myth will
lose its power to help create a strong sense of nationhood and resolve
the tensions produced by Americans' paradoxical commitments.
When one casts the matter in that light, it becomes apparent that
poetic faith in the myth of the written Constitution remains persistently tenuous. The ratified texts leave vast domains of constitutional
meaning still to be constructed. Because the ratified texts carry one
only a short distance when one tries to decide how particular constitutional disputes ought to be resolved, lawyers' often decisive reliance
on extratextual sources of meaning is apparent to anyone who reads
judges' opinions with any measure of care. Moreover, courts threaten
to short-circuit the American people's poetic faith whenever they produce adjudicative outcomes that bear no plausible relationship to the
ratified texts. Even if one thinks that the doctrine of substantive due
process ultimately can be justified by the various factors at play, for
example, one must acknowledge that some manifestations of the doctrine are controversial for good reason: the doctrine threatens to create uncomfortable daylight between the plausible demands of the
ratified texts and the outcomes that judges produce. 292 If the ratified
texts come to be seen as empty vessels into which judges are free to
pour whatever meanings suit their personal preferences-if the public
begins to believe that judges do not find the texts constraining in any
significant way-then the institutions that purport to honor those
292

See supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text (discussing substantive due

process).
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texts will lose their credibility, the myth's fictions will become too
implausible to be embraced even for their mythological value, and the
objectives that the myth is meant to serve will be made harder to
achieve.
At a minimum, therefore, poetic faith in the myth demands that
courts and scholars take the ratified texts seriously. Indeed, the fact
that those in the law often do appear to take the texts seriously goes a
long way toward explaining how poetic faith in the myth has flourished for as long as it has. Despite all of their disagreements, originalists and living constitutionalists posit as shared premises that the
nation's formally ratified texts provide important premises for constitutional analysis, that those texts must be treated with integrity, that
one cannot simply ignore a textual provision because one finds it
objectionable, and that the most unassailable constitutional conclusions are those that appear to flow naturally from the texts and that
are articulated in the texts' vocabulary. By endorsing those propositions, originalists and living constitutionalists help to ensure that the
myth of the written Constitution remains sufficiently plausible to do
the work for which it is valued.
Those wishing to preserve the nation's poetic faith in the myth's
claims thus face a challenge that is comparable to the one that Robert
Post and Reva Siegel argue faces all those who wish both to influence
and to benefit from the nation's constitutional regime:
Although the American constitutional system is rife with conflict, there is nonetheless widespread interest in preserving the
integrity of constitutional law. This is because citizens who seek to
embody their own particular constitutional understandings in law
have reason to preserve the authority of the rule of law, even as they
endeavor to influence the content of judicial decisionmaking.
Those who wish to change the content of constitutional law thus
face a dilemma: they must sway courts to their own constitutional
values and yet they must also preserve the authority of courts to
speak for the Constitution in the name of an independent rule of
law.

293

Because the claims made by the myth of the written Constitution
are not literally true, the nation has the flexibility it needs to construct
a constitutional regime that usefully places great weight upon tradition, judicial precedent, social movements, and other forces external
to the formally ratified texts. But if judges, political leaders, scholars,
and others abuse that freedom by pushing the ratified texts so far to

293

Post & Siegel, supra note 82, at 385.
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the side that the myth's claims lose their capacity to perform their

mythological functions, we eventually may find that we have delegitimized and destabilized the very regime that so many Americans wish
to preserve.
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